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ABSTRACT 
 Civil information management is one of the main tools in conducting 
effective counter insurgency operations, yet there is no definitive doctrine that 
explains how to collect, analyze, or warehouse civil information. This thesis 
provides a methodology for collecting civil information in a counter insurgency 
environment. The proposed methodology provides a foundation for the creation 
of standard operating procedures and tactics to enhance the us military’s 
capability to conduct civil reconnaissance and counter insurgency warfare.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 US Army Civil Affairs branch has been given the task by the Department 
of Defense to conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) as one of its primary 
tasks. CIM has been defined by the Civil Affairs community as the process of 
collecting, analyzing, and warehousing of civil information for others to access in 
order to enhance operational awareness and cultural understanding. The first 
step in CIM is collecting the information or conducting Civil Reconnaissance of 
the operational environment.  
There is no definitive doctrine that explains how to collect, analyze or 
warehouse Civil Information. The anticipated result of this thesis is to provide the 
ground work for the development of a methodology for collecting civil information 
in Irregular Warfare, specifically, the counter insurgency fight. The center of 
gravity of both insurgents and counter-insurgents is the population. Insurgents 
need the population primarily to provide cover and concealment, while offering 
some level of active or passive assistance. Counter insurgent forces need the 
population to provide information that will essentially remove the insurgent’s 
ability to hide, and use non combatants to gain support and facilitate operations. 
This assistance insurgents seek from the population ranges from providing 
recruits and assisting in operations, to turning a blind eye to activities and not 
reveling essential details to counter insurgents. In order to effectively remove the 
insurgent’s ability to hide amongst the population we must first understand the 
population and the underlying motivations for their support of the insurgency.  
The enemy is no longer conspicuous and observable through traditional 
methods and technologies, but can be discovered by observing locally relevant 
phenomena and social networks. Much of the information counter insurgent 
forces need is not gained through covert or technical means but can be 
discovered through regular and systematic interaction with the local population. 
Historically the military focus in counter insurgency warfare is to provide security 
to the population by seeking out insurgents through conventional tactics, which 
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has recently equated in Iraq and Afghanistan to conducting patrols and hoping 
for enemy contact. Some intelligence is derived from interrogations, informants 
and conventional intelligence gathering techniques, but creating operations to 
engage the local population and gain their long term trust and confidence have 
not been designed or conducted on par with direct action style operations.   
 The intent of conducting civil reconnaissance in the counter insurgent 
environment is; to collect civil information in order to engage the civilian 
population with precision; provide an overall enhanced understanding of the 
human terrain; impede the enemies ability to operate freely among the population 
and use it as cover and concealment for operations; reduce the risk of undesired 
secondary and tertiary effects of military operations; and capitalize on 






II. DEFINING CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Civil Reconnaissance (CR) is the process of gathering a broad spectrum 
of civil information about a specific population in support of military operations. 
Civil information encompasses relational, temporal, geospatial and behavioral 
information captured in a socio-cultural backdrop.  It is information developed 
from data related to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, 
and events, within the civil component of the commander’s operational 
environment that can be processed to increase situational awareness and 
understanding. The type of civil information that is needed in order to support 
military operations varies based on the environment and situation. Civil 
Reconnaissance can be conducted in all military operations related to Irregular 
Warfare (IW), Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR). 
In accurately defining the contextual and cultural population of the 
task force  battle space, it became rapidly apparent that we 
needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics as well 
as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqi population.1 
B. CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations.2   
The civilian population has been correctly identified as the center of 
gravity in Irregular Warfare3; civil reconnaissance is the process of collecting 
information in order to understand the population and all the relative factors that 
                                            
1 Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis. Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-
Spectrum Operations, Military Review (July-August 2005): 5. 
2 Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1. September 2007. 1. 
3 Dr. Gordon McCormick, “Guerilla Warfare” class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.  
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bear on conducting successful Irregular Warfare and Counter Insurgency 
Operations (COIN) in selected areas. Insurgents are not easily found using 
conventional electronic sensors and are successfully evading detection by using 
the population as cover and concealment. Civil Reconnaissance begins to 
remove the enemies’ ability to move freely in amongst the local population by 
unraveling the various aspects and systems he relies on to provide his secrecy. 
This is the essence of the “indirect approach”, attacking the elements that 
support the enemy verses the enemy directly. Once US or Coalition Forces can 
find the enemy with precision, than the decision can be made to either capture or 
kill him.  
C. WHAT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS NOT 
Civil Reconnaissance is not the covert collection of information by agents 
employed by US or Coalition forces but rather data obtained from open sources, 
primarily through interaction with the host nation population, review of open 
source information found in various mediums, and academic research. There is a 
great hazard in persons collecting civil information being perceived as covert 
intelligence assets. Every effort must be made by soldiers to avoid this 
perception. The strength of this information is that it is collected through 
interaction with the population. The manner in which the information is collected 
and how operators conduct themselves will have an effect on the level of 
involvement and accuracy of the information provide by non combatants. Many 
locations the US is involved in or has interest in going to are run by regimes that 
live and die on the level of spying they can perform on the population in order to 
rid itself of dissenters or potential enemies of the state. People who live in these 
types of oppressive conditions are leery of telling the truth, especially to 
Westerners, and may not provide any information at all out of fear of reprisal if it 
is discovered.  
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D. IF CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS DONE WRONG 
Any misstep on behalf of US soldiers could spoil efforts over the long term 
and significantly inhibit soldiers in the future from working effectively with the 
population. Not all soldiers possess the natural ability to effectively interact with 
civilians. Our conventional forces are not trained in performing these complex 
interactions and many times portray themselves as intelligence personnel. 
Soldiers need a level of maturity coupled with training in effective techniques that 
are culturally specific and focus on highlighting adaptive thinking in order to 
interact with locals, and build the bridge to mutual trust by providing an open 
conduit for communication. Most, if not all, of the civilians cooperating with the 
US or Coalition are potentially taking their lives in their own hands. This all 
important aspect of civil interaction should never be lost by soldiers that interact 
with civilians. If the enemy witnesses the interaction the level of violence that 
could be brought to bear on the individual or his family will outweigh the value of 
the interaction with US forces.   
E. WHO CONDUCTS CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE 
Officers and NCOs who are more than competent under normal 
conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted 
with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of 
guerilla warfare.4  
 The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy 
people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to 
executing IW.5 
Although the doctrinal definition of Civil Reconnaissance found in the Civil 
Affairs Field Manual FM 3-05.40 dated 15 September, 20066 indicates “other 
                                            
4 Mao Tse-Tung. On Guerilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965. 33. 
5 Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1. September 2007. 1. 
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specialties and assets…can conduct CR…” persons who are not trained or 
ignorant of the complexities of CR could significantly inhibit the ability to collect 
the open source information from the population. Granted all soldiers are human 
sensors and gather information by communicating with and operating among 
civilians, the type of reconnaissance discussed in this thesis addresses the 
trained soldier who has a background in conducting effective dialogue that 
results in gaining information about an area that is pertinent to success in a 
counter insurgent environment.  The most significant characteristic of civil 
information is that the data exists in the open source realm. None of the 
collection techniques utilized in Civil Reconnaissance are conducted covertly. 
One of the hazards in collecting CR is the potential of losing the assistance of the 
population that the information is being collected from due to inappropriate 
actions taken by the collector. This begs the question then who should conduct 
Civil Reconnaissance? Since the Civil Affairs branch has identified the 
management of Civil Information as one of its core tasks it is not a far leap to 
deduce that CA should be the organization responsible for creating the 
commanders Civil Situational Overlay as well as creating operations to support it. 
Infrastructure is currently being created to warehouse the vast amounts of 
detailed collected data within the 95th Civil Affairs Bde, Civil Information 
Management (CIM) Cell.  
1. Clash of Culture; An example from Afghanistan 
 The following is an anecdotal story that provides an example of the 
cultural friction points that exist when working by, with, and through a foreign 
                                            
6 “Civil Reconnaissance is defined as a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and 
evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil Reconnaissance focuses 
specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical 
level by the mnemonic ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events). 
Civil Reconnaissance can be conducted by CA forces or by other forces, as required. Examples 
of other specialties and assets that can conduct Civil Reconnaissance are engineers, medical, 




national population. This example also provides a glimpse into the type of person 
that is needed to operate in this environment and the training that must take 
place in order to effectively work with foreign nationals. Not just anyone can do 
this kind of work, and there is a need for a set of inherent personality traits 
needed by operators in order to achieve the desired end state no matter the  
obstacle. A degree of moral flexibility and an understanding the political and 
strategic significance of handling delicate cultural issues are just a few of the 
characteristic needed in order to function in this environment.        
 During 2002 in Orgun-E a US Army medic was continually treating a 
young 15 year old Afghan soldier who complained of nausea and stomach 
cramps. After repeated treatments, the medic made an effort to further explore 
the cause of the young boys’ ailments. What was revealed both angered the 
medic and placed a significant roadblock in working with the local Afghani 
security forces. It was discovered that the boy’s main function in the unit was to 
provide oral sex to the unit commander every morning. This practice was 
culturally accepted among the locals for several reasons but primarily the sin of 
fornication with an unmarried woman was more culturally unacceptable than 
engaging in sex acts with small boys and other willing men. US forces informally 
inquired into this practice among the Afghani soldier working at the fire base and 
it was discovered that it was rather wide spread, in that, many of the older 
soldiers were using younger ones for both oral and anal sex, and that the 
practice was accepted and permeated the unit.  
 The medic who treated the boy initially reacted very viscerally and 
reached for his weapon in an effort to remedy the situation but was stopped by 
members of the unit and eventually was removed from the FOB. The US forces 
attempted to speak to the commander about his sexual use of this young boy 
and the effects of his actions were having on the relationship with US and 
Coalition forces. The commander indicated he understood the issue but, was 
never compelled to stop or change his behavior and the soldiers of his unit 
continued as well.  
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 In the effort to work by, with, and through Afghan locals, the relationship 
with the Afghani security force was deemed more valuable than fighting over the 
cultural acceptance of homosexual rape of the young boys. US and Coalition 
soldiers were forced to not intervene, and except the fact the practice would 
continue. The extent the US forces got involved was to advised the young boys 
involved to eat bread before performing oral sex to help with the nausea. As a 
result of this incident the Afghani leadership no longer allowed the young Afghan 
boys to be seen by American medics, and the practice continues today. Incident 
of homosexual rape and bestiality among the Afghans has become an excepted 
fact in working with the Afghan nationals and other predominately Islamic 
countries. The act is not isolated within their military, but is practiced among the 
rural Afghan nationals and witness by most who spend any significant amount of 
time living among them. Although Islam forbids homosexuality it has been 
assimilated to a lesser sin than adultery as it is interpreted by the men who 
engage in this practice.7   
 The Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) taught at the JFK Special 
Warfare Center and School (SWC) have adopted cutting edge technology to both 
train and evaluate CA soldiers in their ability to be comfortable and effective in 
the art of cross cultural communication and adaptive learning techniques. Active 
duty Civil Affairs Officers receive additional regional cultural training that align 
with the combatant commands that is found nowhere else in the military. This 
specialized training coupled with psychological reviews given during the CAQC 
provides a fertile environment to create the best possible soldiers to conduct Civil 
Reconnaissance. 8 
                                            
7 Author notes, Afghanistan deployment 2004. 
8 Elbert Ross. “The Changing Face of Civil Affairs; Training Today to Meet Tomorrows 
Challenges”. Special Warfare Magazine, Ft. Bragg, NC, July 2006. 
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F. HUMAN TERRAIN 
Although the origin of the term is uncertain “Human Terrain” has been 
used by the military and academic community as short hand to refer to the totality 
of civil information.  Human terrain” has been defined as, “the population and 
society in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and 
characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other 
non-geophysical information about that human population and society. Human 
terrain information is open-source derived, unclassified, referenced information. It 
includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an 
operationally relevant group or individual.”9  
The term is akin to the evaluation of the physical terrain conducted during 
the planning of military operations at all levels, captured best in the Army 
acronym OCOKA (Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, 
Obstacles, Key terrain and Avenues of approach). Soldiers and leaders are 
beginning to understand that the civil depiction of the battlefield or the “Human 
Terrain” is as significant to Irregular Warfare as key terrain and avenues of 
approach is to conventional operations. How the area of operations is described 
through the civil perspective is the true battlefield in Unconventional Warfare 
(UW) operations. 
The “terrain” we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. 
It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the 
other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why 
claims that ‘80% of AQ leadership have fled’ don’t  overly disturb 
us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather drive them 
off, so that we  can work with the community to prevent their 
return.10 
                                            
9 Jacob Kipp, Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, “The Human Terrain 
System: A COORDS for the 21st Century” Military Review September-October  (2006) : 8. 
10 Dave Kilcullen, “Understanding Current Operations in Iraq” Small Wars Journal (URL:  
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/) accessed 27 August, 
2007. 
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Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict 
what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better 
understand what motivates them, what is important to the host 
nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support 
of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the 
enemy.11 
                                            
11 (Major General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, CJTF-76, Afghanistan, 
2006) found in Jacob Kipp, Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, “The Human 
Terrain System: A COORDS for the 21st Century” Military Review September-October  (2006) : 
8. 
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III. WHY CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The enemy stands on alighted stage; from the darkness around 
him, thousands of unseen eyes intently study his every move, his 
every gesture. When he strikes out, he hits the air; his antagonists 
are insubstantial, as intangible as fleeting shadows in the 
moonlight. Because of superior information, guerillas always 
engage under conditions of there own choosing; because of 
superior knowledge of terrain [physical and human], they are able 
to use it to their advantage and the enemy’s discomfiture.12 
Conducting civil reconnaissance provides the information needed in order 
to understand the human terrain in order to design effective counter insurgency 
operations. Information is what the population possess that is the deciding factor 
in who wins and who looses in unconventional warfare. The population keeps the 
secrets of the insurgent and provides the cover, concealment, and resources 
needed in order to remain alive and able to carry out operations against their 
enemy. Counter insurgent forces need the same information, who insurgents are, 
where they live and operate and how to best interdict their operations in order to 
destroy the organization. The people possess this knowledge and the real war is 
fighting over who will win the support of the population in order to gain the 
information superiority.  
Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must understand 
the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host-nation 
(HN) government.  Commanders and planners require insight into 
cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making 
processes of individuals and groups. These requirements are the 
basis for collection and analytical efforts.13 
 Conducting Civil Reconnaissance provides information about the 
population used to begin to gain support and in creating effective operations to 
                                            
12 Mao, p. 23. 
13 FM 3-24. Counter Insurgency. 16 June 2006. Section 3-2. p. 3-1.  
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defeat insurgents. Gaining cultural awareness and providing for the needs of the 
population will create the environment necessary to begin to gain the support of 
locals. Without the necessary information on the enemy, counter insurgent forces 
are operating blindly, often making more mistakes and further separating 
themselves from the population and their true goal of finding an fixing the enemy. 
The fight initially is to gain the support of the population in order to glean the 
necessary information and intelligence needed to find the enemy.  
Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers 
wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing 
unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like 
surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital 
organs intact. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, 
and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest 
possible level and disseminated throughout the force.14 
B. THE ENEMY 
Becoming in tune with the population will provide critical information about 
the enemy and the tactics he employs to gain support. “Guerilla leaders spend a 
great deal more time in organization, instruction, agitating, and propaganda work 
than they do fighting, for their most important job is to win over the people.”15 In 
understanding how the enemy fights the war, effective counter insurgency units 
can design operations to disrupt his efforts and begin to counter his moves. It 
could be argued, attacks by insurgence serve several functions; first, to distract 
from the true fight over gaining the support of the population, second elicit a more 
restrictive response from counter insurgent forces on a community that the attack 
came from, thus frustrating the non combatant population and motivating them 
into supporting the insurgency out of a sense of frustration and anger.16 
Understanding how the enemy operates in a community will reveal critical 
details on how to defeat him. In order for the insurgent to gain support he must 
                                            
14 FM 3-24. Counter Insurgency. 16 June 2006. Section 3-2. p. 123.  
15 Mao, 8. 
16 Class notes Guerilla Warfare class, Dr Gordon McCormick, 2006. 
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have a mechanism of communicating with them. The Taliban’s use of “Night 
Letters” is an example of a method used to communicate with a population.  
One good example of Taliban information strategy is their use of 
“night letters.” They have been pushing local farmers in several 
provinces (Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar) to grow poppy instead of 
regular crops, and using night-time threats and intimidation to 
punish those who don’t and convince others to convert to poppy. 
This is not because they need more opium—God knows they 
already have enough—but because they’re trying to detach the 
local people from the legal economy and the legally approved 
governance system of the provinces and districts, to weaken the 
hold of central and provincial government. Get the people doing 
something illegal, and they’re less likely to feel able to support the 
government, and more willing to do other illegal things (e.g. join the 
insurgency)—this is a classic old Bolshevik tactic from the early 
cold war, by the way. They are specifically trying to send the 
message: “The government can neither help you nor hurt us. We 
can hurt you, or protect you—the choice is yours.” They also use 
object lessons, making an example of people who don’t 
cooperate—for example, dozens of provincial-level officials have 
been assassinated this year, again as an “armed propaganda” 
tool—not because they want one official less but because they 
want to send the message “We can reach out and touch you if you 
cross us.” Classic armed information operations.17 
In Vietnam the Communist Party members moved into villages at night to 
communicate with locals and spread propaganda as well as conduct operations 
against non supporters and dissenters. From just understanding the method the 
enemy uses to communicate with the population operations can be created to 
observe and learn about the enemy. Who conducts the communications, where it 
is done primarily, who might be working for the enemy in allowing safe haven 18 
                                            
17George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy; Can Social Scientists Redefine the War on Terror,” 
The New Yorker, December 2006,    
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2?currentPage=1accessed 16 
November 2007. 
18 William Andrews, The Village War (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 30. 
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Gaining an appreciation of the population and learning the cultural 
dynamics and personalities will allow the enemy’s vulnerabilities to be known. 
Tribal differences, old vendettas, personality conflicts and politics are all factors 
in the soup of culture that once understood could be exploited by counter 
insurgent forces to gain support. Most recently the Iraqi Sunni’s resistance to al-
Qaeda serves as a living example of the power in understanding the human 
terrain. The friction point with Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda stems from a cultural 
issue that runs deep in Islam. Members of AQ are trying to entrench support in 
Iraq via the clans, villages and towns by marrying into families of local leaders.19 
The cultural impact the act of marrying into families is significant. In cases where 
this has been done successfully the family essentially becomes a proxy member 
of AQ out of cultural obligation, for example should the AQ member be killed by 
Coalition forces it falls to the family to avenge his death, regardless of political 
beliefs. Once the relational bond has been established the male has a certain 
status and say that sways the locals and family members to accomplish AQ or 
anti western objectives.20 In the majority of Islam, family is the cornerstone of the 
social system. Family is not a casual or spontaneous organization of people, but 
it is a divinely ordained institution. Family and marriage are regarded as noble 
and sacred; a social contract that confers mutual rights and obligations on the 
couple.21 Iraqi culture does not allow marriages for convenience  as do Muslims 
in tribal Afghanistan where members of AQ and the Taliban have found success 
in marrying into families. AQ has effectively fallen victim of their lack of cultural 
understanding of the Iraqi population. This serves as both a great example of an 
opportunity as well as a model of how bad things could go if untrained soldiers 
                                            
19 Dave Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal Aug 29 2007 (online 
journal) accessed at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/ 
20 Ibid, on-line article no page number. 
21 Reading Islam (website) 
http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1176271732901&pagename=Zon
e-English-Discover_Islam%2FDIELayout accessed 25 September 2007.   
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attempt to try a culturally significant operation or effort that fails that is equivalent 
to AQ’s marriage plot. This information can be used in countless ways to exploit 
AQ and attack their credibility among the local population. 
If insurrection is said to be an art, the main content of this art is to 
know how to give the struggle forms appropriate to the political 
situation at each stage.22  
Understanding how the enemy is giving the struggle structure and form is 
critical in destroying it. “We must patiently explain…”persuade”, “discuss” and 
“convince”- theses words recur with monotonous regularity in many of the early 
Chinese essays on guerilla war.”23 Learning whatever the insurgents are 
promising, providing or doing to the population in exchange for support creates 
an opportunity. Many times insurgents begin to gain initial support by providing 
something the central government has failed to give.24 Culturally specific issues 
come to light in examining this aspect that could provide the opportunity for 
success by counter insurgent forces if handled properly. An example of one of 
the most effective uses of culturally significant information used to persuade a 
population was the agrarian strategy of the Vietnamese Communists. The 
Vietnamese culture places a high premium on land as captured in this saying, 
“An ounce of earth is worth an ounce of gold”. To the traditional Vietnamese that 
lived outside of the cities land means far more than just livelihood; it enabled 
families to venerate their ancestors by maintaining their tombs and assures 
descendants would be taken care of after their death. “Ownership of the land 
takes care of the past, present and future of the peasant.”25 The Communist 
gained significant support after announcing the plan to forcefully redistribute the 
land among the poor that worked it verses the owners. Since the country was 
                                            
22 (Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army, p 76) in Andrews, The Village War 
23 Mao, 8. 
24 Class notes, Guerilla Warfare, Dr. Gordon McCormick 2006. 
25 William Bredo, Agraian Reform in Vietnam: Viet Cong and Government of Vietnam  
Strategies in Conflict,” Asian Survey, 10, 8 (August 1970), 738. 
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owed by the rich 2%, this proposal had significant appeal to the poor, who were 
unable to afford their own plots and were forced to pay rent and work fields to 
just break even.  Although this bit of propaganda wasn’t presented initially during 
the Communist takeover because it would have alienated the wealthy and 
created opposition to the movement it was used selectively as the Communists 
progressed and had taken hold in the rural areas.26  
The Taliban’s establishment of an immediate rule of law that was based 
upon Islamic jurisprudence provided the cultural appeal, at least initially, to local 
Afghans. The country had no sense of government or security after the retreat of 
the Soviet Union, the Taliban seized upon this vacuum to gain initial support.  
This was also initially welcomed around the world, seen as the people of 
Afghanistan reacquiring ownership of their country. Issues surfaced in the 
extremely harsh interpretation of the Koran and application of conservative tribal 
code in a manner in which served to oppress all non Taliban (a.k.a. true believers 
of Islam) in Afghanistan. “The Taliban’s refusal to compromise with the UN 
humanitarian agencies or foreign donor countries or to compromise in their 
principles in exchange for international recognition and their rejection of all 
Muslim ruling elites as corrupt, has inflamed the debate in the Muslim world and 
inspired a younger generation of Islamic militants.”27 This continues to be a major 
attraction to tribal populations that are so far separated from a Central 
government that the Taliban version of law and order is more reflective of that 
society than that of what is perceived by the Taliban as a non secular, Karzai led 
government.28 Mao believed “Military action is a method used to obtain a political 
goal.”29, what is the insurgents political objective? Analyzing actions taken to 
identify why they are conducting them will provide answers to many questions 
and help focus operations to target the enemy’s true political objective.  
                                            
26 Andrews, 6. 
27 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (United States: Yale University Press, 2001), 93. 
28 Ibid., 95. 
29 Mao, 89. 
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In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers 
out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. 
Guerillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to 
ensure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware 
of the issues at stake. A trained and discipline guerilla is much 
more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an 
antiquated fowling-piece and a homemade bomb. His indoctrination 
begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is 
unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and political alert 
fighting man.30  
Ideology provides motivation to insurgence and serves as the life blood of 
the fight. Making soldiers intimately aware of the politics behind their actions and 
why their sacrifice is important on the largest scale possible makes the insurgent 
motivated and can provide him answers in how to behave and contribute to the 
strategic plan at the tactical level. Not only is the ideology of why they fight 
important but how they fight as well. Evidence of this exists in Mao creation of the 
Eight Points of Attention that were used to govern the actions of insurgents when 
working with the population.31  
 8 Points for Attention 
• Speak politely. 
• Pay fairly for what you buy. 
• Return everything you borrow. 
• Pay for anything you damage. 
• Do not hit or swear at people. 
• Do not damage crops. 
• Do not take liberties with women. 
• Do not ill treat captives. 
It is also “the story” used to recruit support from the population. Identifying 
the specific rhetoric used and the context it is placed in will help to determine 
much about the enemy, why he fights, what his goals are and how far he is 
willing to go in accomplishing his objective. Fighting the ideology in a UW 
environment is as important as killing the enemy. “Historical experience suggests 
                                            
30 Mao, 8. 
31 Mao., 92. 
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that there is very little hope of destroying a…guerilla movement after it 
has…acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the 
population.”32 Ideology is the foundation of the enemies argument used to 
persuade the population to support its cause, effective use of Civil 
Reconnaissance will quickly identify the ideology used and allow the maximum 
amount of time to develop counters to it and attack its credibility. Ideology will 
differ throughout an area of operations based on what the local population deems 
important. The enemy will adapt his rhetoric and propaganda to achieve his 
desired affects based upon what will work in the community. This is a point of 
weakness and can be used to discredit the insurgent. 
In the case of Islamic militants, the added dimension of religious obligation 
and jurisprudence for their actions provides a base of belief in “the cause” that 
has been cultivated even before fighting began.  Understanding the ideology is 
one of the most significant aspects of the civil reconnaissance effort, and until it 
is expressed by individuals of the population having been indoctrinated in it, it will 
not be fully known. Making an assumption as to the ideology being used will only 
hazard clumsy guesses that will lead to problems in developing ways to counter 
it.  
Understanding the human terrain will allow tactical and operational 
planners to be creative in generating operations to win civil support as well as 
targeting the enemy. Each sector, region, village or town may need a 
fundamentally similar strategy that is different in the tactical actions required in 
order to achieve a desired end state. One of the biggest lessons learned in 
fighting in a COIN environment is the need for decentralized planning and the 
empowerment of lower-level leaders to develop and execute operations against a  
very nimble adversary.33 Conducting an effective assessment of the 
human terrain both before and immediately after entering into an area of 
                                            
32 Mao, 27. 
33 Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon; A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective 
on Information Operations,” Military Review May-June (2006): 13-32. 
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operations will ensure the best possible understanding of the pertinent civil 
information needed to make effective decisions and create appropriate 
operations.  
Che Guevara’s attempt at creating an insurgency in Bolivia was symbolic 
of the effects of not conducting civil reconnaissance in a UW environment. The 
most significant mistake made by Che was the assumption that the population he 
believed would help facilitate an insurrection (Indians of the southeast) could be 
motivated to fight. In fact, Che selected a portion of the population that was as 
leery of foreigners as they were of the central government. “The President of 
Bolivia once told a visiting general from the United States that his greatest 
political problem was to persuade his countrymen that such a nation as Bolivia 
existed with a capital called La Paz. Nowhere did national identity have less 
impact than among the Indians of the southeast.”34 Additional evidence of Che’s 
lack of any Civil Reconnaissance is demonstrated in his own diary when he notes 
the targeted population does not speak Spanish but a language of local 
derivation.35 Had he done the most basic of research into the targeted population 
he would have discovered the need to learn another language or at least to 
obtain supportive translators in order to conduct operations against a central 
government. Evidence exists in the Bolivian government record that they feared 
an insurgent effort beginning in the mining population of the country. In making 
this educated assessment, the government increase troop strength and were  
waiting for Che’s attempt at influencing a revolutionary ripe population. Had Che 
figured out that the governments understanding of the civil domain had allowed it 
to prepare operations that would have resulted in the destruction of his force with 
little to no effort, he might have thought twice about civil reconnaissance. 36 
                                            
34 Henry Ryan, “ The Fall of Che Guevara” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 42. 
35 Ibid, 42. 
36 Ibid, 43. 
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C. ON FRIENDSHIP  
Civil reconnaissance provides feedback from the targeted community on 
the effectiveness of both combat and non-combat operations as well as pitfalls to 
avoid. The correct metric to measure success will vary location from location. 
Keeping a finger of the pulse of the targeted community will allow counter 
insurgency forces to assess their performance and make corrections to better 
achieve the desired effects.  
Providing the opportunity for locals to interact with counter insurgent 
forces is  the goal of all counter insurgent operations. Many times locals might be 
willing to provide information intentionally or unintentionally. During the course of 
conducting effective Civil Reconnaissance information may come to light that 
may or may not be solicited or targeted. The following is an example of the 
unlimited possibilities that can result from just being amongst the local population 
with soldiers trained in conducting passive Civil Reconnaissance.  
1. The Phone Number- (When Opportunity Meets Preparation) 
During a relief in place in Afghanistan, two Civil Affairs Teams Alpha 
(CAT-A) 523 and 522 while in support of the 75th Ranger Regiment were 
conducting area familiarization rides to orient the new team to the terrain and 
meet key local civilians. During one of the stops in a village in Northern 
Afghanistan a child approached the Civil Affairs team members while they were 
waiting outside the house of the local Imam. The young boy appeared from a 
building very close by with a pen and paper wanting the soldiers to write anything 
in English. In the course of the engagement with the child the CA soldier noticed 
a series of numbers on one of the pages of the notebook. The numbers seemed 
familiar for some reason but time was short and the patrol was moving on so the 
CA soldier took a digital picture of the page to analyze the numbers later. He also 
had the wherewithal to photograph the father of the young child and the house 
form where the child came from before departing the village. Once the CA soldier 
returned to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and had time to review his picture 
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of the numbers in more detail, he discovered it was a phone number as it would 
appear on a satellite phone. After a further analysis on the part of the team it was 
determined the country code was of the US and area code was of California. The 
CA soldier immediately brought this to the attention of his Team Leader and the 
number was sent to the CA planning cell at the Task Force. The planning cell 
enlisted the assistance of the FBI representative assigned to the unit for follow up 
and a possible lead. Within a short time the FBI identified the number as a safe 
house under surveillance in Sacramento that had been previously suspected of 
organizing a local cell of al-Qaeda. The number was the needed probable cause 
to affect a warrant for the search of the house. The search resulted in the arrest 
of the entire cell and further evidence to identify other cells operating in the 
Western USA. This US based cell was taken down as a result of open source 
information gathered by an aware soldier in the right place at the right time. As a 
result of the discovery future operations were designed to monitor the village and 
the individuals in possession of the satellite phone and phone number. The 
village was targeted by eavesdropping assets that helped shape further 
operation in the area. The individuals were not immediately taken into custody 
but kept under watch for a period of time, resulting in the identification of other 
collaborators and further exposure of the Taliban insurgents operating in the 
area.37  
                                            
37 Author’s notes during Afghanistan 2004. 
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Figure 1.   Actual photograph of local boy who provided phone number and the 
numbers provided during the relief in place. 
2. AL NUKHAYB (What Right Looks Like) 
During the initial advance into Iraq it was decided by SOCOM that the 
town of al-Nukhayb in the Anbar Province would be one of the first targets of the 
Coalition. The town was selected due to the presence of anti aircraft artillery 
pieces and dug in fighting positions around the entire town. It was decided 2nd 
Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment would be selected to seize the town and 
destroy any Iraqi military or Saddam loyalists present.  
After the town had been seized, Rangers of C Company, 2nd Battalion of 
the 75th Regiment secured the area and the Civil Affairs Team Alpha (CAT-A) 51 
went about establishing who was the local leadership of the town and opened a 
dialogue that resulted in significant amounts of information and intelligence.  
During the course of the clearing of the buildings in the town the Rangers 
discovered a huge ammunition cache that was estimated at approximately three 
tons of anti aircraft and small arms bullets and RPG rounds. It was determined 
that the building holding the cache was to be destroyed in an effort to prevent the 
ammunition from being employed against follow on US forces. The CAT-A 
discovered during the course of conversation with local elders that the building 
was the town hospital and had been seized by the Iraqi military after Desert 
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Storm.  With this information the CAT-A further assessed the building and 
discovered it also served as a quasi detention facility. Rooms in the hospital had 
been altered to function as prison cells and torture rooms with hooks protruding 
from the walls and ceiling and closest converted to spaces not big enough to 
stand in, but with no way of sitting either. In addition to the ammunition an 
extensive amount of chemical protective gear was also discovered. Gas masks, 
filters and suits designed to protect soldiers from chemical attack filled what was 
once a doctor’s office. The hospital still contained the records of the town’s 
people and could be used as a hospital once again if the ammunition and military 
equipment was cleared. The CAT-A Team Leader advised the Ranger Company 
commander of the effects destroying the hospital could have on the Coalition’s 
efforts, and the support that the story could provide to the enemy. The decision 
was quickly made not to blow up the building but to utilize soldiers and civilians to 
remove the explosives, ammunition and chemical gear to another location for 
destruction. Rangers provided security while other soldiers shed body armor, 
holstered weapons and began the arduous task of emptying the hospital of its 
deadly contents. This act by US forces demonstrated the true intent of the 
Coalition to the locals of al Nukhayb and significantly changed the tide of 
information that flowed in. Immediately following the return of the hospital to the 
town, the Civil Affairs team was inundated with information. Locals began 
producing; identification cards of Saddam Fedayeen that had fled after the 
invasion began, passports, certificates of graduation from Fedayeen training 
camps and descriptions of military forces and commanders that frequented the 
area.  
Before departing the area Rangers assisted the CAT-A in distributing what 
was left of a pallet of water and food to the locals in an effort to solidify trust and 
build a solid rapport for follow on forces. During the distribution the Imam 
approached the CAT-A Team Leader and indicated there was a foreigner 
amongst the crowd that nobody recognized and might be trouble. The individual 
was removed from the crowd by the CA team and questioned with the Imam 
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present. The man was from Baghdad and was looking for his brother who was an 
Iraqi soldier stationed in the town but had left once the invasion started. The 
Imam decided to provide shelter to the individual until time was appropriate for 
him to leave after being questioned by US forces.38 
 
 
Figure 2.   Ranger Company Commander interacting with locals during food 
distribution. 
Had the CA Team not conducted effective civil reconnaissance; the 
Coalition would have missed critical information, been responsible for blowing up 
a hospital, and possibly created more insurgents and insurgent supporters. The 
fight for establishing rapport and population support would have been halted 
before it had a chance to begin.39  
                                            
38 Author’s notes Iraq deployment.  
39 Ibid. 
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The essence of the indirect approach in Counter Insurgency is addressing 
the elements who support the enemy verses the enemy directly. By focusing on 
the civil aspect of the battlefield we remove the enemy’s ability to use the 
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IV. HOW TO CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The following is a suggested methodology of how to conduct Civil 
Reconnaissance. Never has the adage, “train for certainty, but educate for 
uncertainty” been more applicable than in understanding how to conduct Civil 
Reconnaissance. What this chapter does not offer is a cookie cutter template for 
conducting Civil Reconnaissance solution, but instead provides a suggested 
manner of thinking. This methodology could be used as a foundation for the 
development of a battle drill or standard operating procedures. In order for the 
military to become better at this critical effort there exists a need to create a more 
systematic approach to conducting this task. The process of effectively 
conducting this type of reconnaissance requires a type of personality, a high level 
of patience, ability to communicate cross culturally and going beyond one’s 
individual cultural bias in order to gain information and correctly interpret others.  
 The proposed methodology is broken down into three phases; pre 
deployment, deployment and post deployment. Each phase has particular tasks 
and focus but all contribute to painting the best picture possible of the human 
terrain. Additionally throughout the process, a level of attention must be paid to 
the use of technology to assist in conducting analysis and storing information. 
Presently, the Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK) is currently being used by the 
Special Operations Community to help catalog and analyze data in order to 
better understand the human terrain. In the future, this technology will advance 
and hopefully become more user friendly and helpful in analysis. Before 
deployment, the methodology centers on researching the targeted area or areas 
using as many different sources as possible in order to gain as firm an 
understanding as feasible before leaving the continental United States. Actions 
conducted during deployment are the real focus and substance of this thesis. 
Creating operations in order to deliberately discover information and gain a 
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detailed understanding of the human terrain requires lots of effort, patience and 
well thought out and executed missions. Finally, after deployment focuses on 
properly storing and passing on the information gleaned during the deployment.  
 Objectively understanding a culture is difficult enough: trying to 
understand it to the point it can be analyzed and interpreted to support military 
operations is a huge undertaking. The military faces an even larger obstacle in 
that the enemy we are facing more often than not is of the very population we are 
trying to learn about. It is the enemy’s back yard, he knows the people, customs 
and is part of the culture, he has the advantage of time and information in 
preparing for our arrival. All of this must be taken into consideration at the onset 
and never forgotten throughout the process.  
B. PRE DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
 The pre deployment phase is about conducting research and being 
prepared before leaving the continental United States. The goal is to be ready 
before the need arises by getting in tune with the state of play in the AOR, and 
becoming as culturally savvy as possible before the notice to deploy. Once the 
unit is notified of the mission, there will not be enough time to adequately gain 
the needed cultural and situational awareness to be effective once the unit 
arrives in country.  Being able to provide some level of analysis of the human 
terrain to commanders in order to conduct effective counter insurgency 
operations is what active duty Civil Affairs is expected to do at a minimum.  
 The topics most significant in pre-deployment research encompasses both 
civil and cultural information as well as gaining an understanding of what is 
planned and programmed for the target area from other agencies in the US 
government. These plans are essential in understanding United States foreign 
policy plans for the target country and provides a framework at the macro level 
that will come to play significantly at the micro level when considering potential 
operations. With the military’s attempt at strengthening Security Stability 
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Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) a firm grasp of the plans and budgeting 
allocations of efforts in the targeted area is essential in order to prevent overlap 
or duplication of efforts by all organizations involved.   
 The Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) has the overall 
responsibility for maintaining a finger on the pulse of their individual area of 
responsibility and is where research efforts should begin. With the creation of the 
Operational Plan (OPLAN) 7500 (OPLAN for the Global War on Terrorism) each 
individual GCC has developed plans that are nested in 7500. In conjunction with 
the military OPLANs the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) also have similar documents in the form of 
Country Plans that outline the US government’s strategy in the region and 
individual countries.  
 Once the GCC, DoS and USAID have been queried the next significant 
piece of information is the supported Joint Task Force (JTF) OPLAN. This 
document will provide another level of analysis and instruction on how the task 
force plans to defeat the enemy and nest plans in accordance with DoS, USAID 
and the GCC.    
 After the macro level of analysis has been done, and a firm understanding 
of the US governments articulated plans is achieved , teams should research 
what is available from the special operations debrief and retrieval system 
(SODARS)40 and final after action reports from units that have deployed 
previously to the targeted area. Most of this information will be found in the 
Secret [formerly Secure] Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) and requires 
access to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
intranet. Once all available reports have been collected and read speaking 
directly to the units that are in the area of operation and researching what has 
been done by the unit being replaced is the next step. This phase will take the 
                                            
40 SODAR is a collection of out detailed out briefs that are required from within the SOF 
community immediately following deployments. The effort has had sporadic support since its 
inception and is very much driven by the command climate of the units that submit information to 
this system.   
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most time and effort since it requires reading whatever data has been collected 
and is available as far back as possible. The sources for this information are the 
teams in country as well as the Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell at the 
95th Civil Affairs Brigade. With the use of the Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK) all 
the available data should be available at the CIM cell in order to help teams 
maintain a high level of continuity and provide the history and cultural 
background for the specific AOR. If time is limited in mission preparation, it 
should be spent on this level of analysis and research. If the devil is in the 
details, these are the best details available until the unit arrives in the AOR.  
 Once the macro and micro level of analysis has been begun physical 
preparations become critical in quickly deploying and becoming effective as fast 
as possible with minimal loss of information or history. In using the ASK system 
there are steps that are critical to take in order to prepare the software for 
immediate usage before leaving the continental United States. The level of detail 
required to be efficient in utilizing the ASK is an entire thesis in and of itself. The 
SOF community should spend the time and effort in creating pre-mission 
checklists for the ASK in order to assist teams in preparing as efficiently as 
possible. It is sufficient to say downloading all available information into the ASK 
system and ensuring the needed maps, satellite imagery and software version 
are uploaded and operational is as critical as zeroing your weapon at the range 
before going to war in the counter insurgency fight.    
 Civil Affairs planners and teams leaders should attempt to conduct a Pre 
Deployment Site Survey (PDSS)41 before the incoming unit arrives in country. 
The PDSS provides a very small glimpse into the area of operations in order to 
help the incoming unit better prepare for the deployment. Any time spent 
understanding the geospatial, relational or temporal information is critical but 
there is also a need to gain a deeper appreciation for the nuisances, 
                                            
41 PDSS is an operation conducted by a small element of the deploying unit. This element is 
usually made up of key personnel that travels independent of the main body and conducts an on 
the ground survey of the location, the mission, and make initial coordination necessary for relief in 
place operations.  
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personalities and “sub rosa” issues when working in cross cultural environments. 
The rotation of units in a counter insurgent environment is the point of most 
weakness. Constantly rebuilding relationships that in some countries and 
cultures don’t come easy cost time we don’t have lots of. The enemy benefits at 
points where counter insurgent forces have to start over and regain the collective 
knowledge discovered from all the previous rotations. Without the knowledge 
base and an effective method of transferring the details the US will fight the war 
starting over at every rotation.   
 Pre-Deployment Operations continue even after arriving in country. Once 
the team arrives at their respective geographic locations the actual relief in place 
(RIP) is the next critical event. Just as important as collecting the data on the 
local population is the ability to seamlessly transition it between units and 
individuals. If everything has been collected, cataloged, and documented 
perfectly it is all for nothing if it cannot be effectively passed on. Systemically 
Soldiers at the tactical level have failed at conducting truly effective counter 
insurgency style RIP operations. With the widespread use of the ASK the 
problem of information continuity will get better over time. In addition to the raw 
digits of data comes the meeting and transitioning of contacts in the community. 
Civil Affairs is all about the development of relationships in the local population, 
and if the contacts or sources cannot be transferred to follow on forces then we 
will; be open to manipulation by local nationals, ineffective in fighting the COIN 
fight and have wasted the time of soldiers that have collected the data and built 
the relationships with the population previously.  
C. DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
1. Introduction 
 The main effort in separating insurgents from the population is designing 
operations that create opportunities for meaningful interaction with local 
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civilians.42 Planning operations to further enhance the operational understanding 
of the cultural and local information is the conceptual equivalent of “draining the 
pond”. The goal of Civil Reconnaissance is to gain as much information as 
possible about the population in order to decrease the information advantage of 
the enemy. By closing the information gap insurgents begin to run out of cover 
and concealment. If one civilian or just interacting with civilians provides a piece 
of information that leads to better understanding the civil environment then the 
operation has proven successful. These planned interactions need to be well 
orchestrated and given the same level of planning, support and seriousness that 
conducting a direct action mission or movement to contact requires.  
 There are a number of significant secondary objectives that can be 
accomplished while interacting with the local population. Any time soldiers 
communicate verbally or non verbally with locals they are representing the US 
and the Coalition. Every action and movement will be interpreted and placed into 
the collective memory of all who witness it. Soldier interaction is one of the best 
counter propaganda efforts the US can conduct. Mao recognized this significant 
aspect in working with the local population and made soldiers behavior when 
working with locals a priority. Mao wrote rules that addressed actions with 
civilians much like our rules of engagement.43 Anytime soldiers interact and 
move around a community they become passive collectors of information and the 
data is of some value in adding to depict the Human Terrain.  
                                            
42 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: OEF-Philippines and indirect 
approach,” Military Review Nov 1, 2006. In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created the triangle 
insurgent/COIN model. He later created the Diamond Model to capture the interaction with 
external international actors. See Gordon H. McCormick, "A 'Pocket Guide' to Internal War," 
Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming. Leg 1 of the Diamond 
model encapsulates the need for engaging the local population in order to gain situational 
awareness and information. 
43 see reference 30 for the rules dictated by Mao. 
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2. The Survey 
The first step in trying to understand the human terrain is to conduct an 
assessment of the population. This assessment is designed to be the first layer 
of information about the population in the geographic area. The initial 
assessment should have started as part of the predeployment preparation. The 
use of surveys and assessment tools is not new to insurgency style warfare.  
Successful insurgents utilize the same method of conducting initial surveys to 
assess how to approach a community.  Examining what previous insurgent 
efforts have done and surveys they utilized provides an idea of things counter 
insurgent need to consider as well.  
In the Dang Lao Dong’s (Communist Vietnamese) approach to the 
conduct of civil reconnaissance in the rural areas of Vietnam, they initially 
categorized the area of operations into three types: the liberated areas, 
temporarily liberated areas and contested areas.44 Liberated areas were defined 
as “areas firmly under the control of the Communist party at all times, save for 
brief incursions by Government troops from outside”.45 Temporarily liberated 
areas were defined as “…villages in which the presence of government force 
denied the Party full control”. “The contested areas where those in which the 
government had its strongest forces, and exercised strong control of the 
population”.46 Once the cadre had divided the geographic areas up they 
systematically moved into the liberated areas or easily governed space and 
began operations to slowly take control of the contested areas. The Party coined 
this method “tu the vot can cau” (line casting position), this term provided an 
image of a fisherman, who by remaining in one spot cast his line out to catch fish 
close to him.47 The first task once the areas had been coded using the Party’s 
                                            
44 Andrews, 43. 
45 Ibid, 43. 
46 Ibid, 43. 
47 Andrews, 45. 
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method was to send in trained cadre to conduct surveys of the targeted villages. 
These cadre covertly moved into these targeted towns and began assessing the 
strengths and weakness of the population as well as identifying potential weak 
points where influence, blackmail and infighting could be exploited in order to 
gain control of the population. Captured documents detailed some of the 
information Communists survey teams were interested in.   
1. Geographical position, terrain, population; is it situated near 
communication lines, plantations, military bases, etc.? 
2. Enemy situation [Presence of Government]: administrative 
committee, police militia, spies, etc. Schemes and activities of the 
above-mentioned organization: activities of upper level men 
coming to the village: (cadres coming to carry out communism 
denouncing tasks, collecting taxes, carry out community 
development…etc.); internal discord; attitude in executing 
[Government] orders. 
3. Masses situation: Classes, social strata, circles, religious habits 
and costumes, cultural standards… 
4. [Strength of Party members] : thought , morale, revolutionary 
ability. 
Points two and three were most strongly emphasized by village cadre 
when conducting their version of civil reconnaissance. Other documents later 
revealed the cadre tailored versions of this survey based upon different cultural 
environments. The one constant used in all surveys was the detailed analysis of 
the class structure of the villages in which the targeted population lived and 
worked. Additional information that the covert assessment teams examined were 
potential recruits. Persons who had family problems, were indebt, or in trouble 
with the law or were seen as potential recruits or sympathizers.   
 The surveys were developed from Mao Tse-Tung article, “How to 
Differentiate Classes in Rural Areas”.48 Mao broke down the population in the 
following categories; landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, 
and the worker. The Dang Lao Dong adapted these categories and modified 
                                            
48 Mao Tse-Tung. “How to Differentiate Classes in the Rural Areas,”  
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/date-index.htm see date for 
October 1933 accessed October 2007. 
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them to make the survey more culturally relevant to their country and the 
targeted village. An example of the cultural alterations the Dang Lao Dong Party 
made from Mao’s version is the change from worker to landless peasant 
category. This was a critical yet seemingly insignificant change but better 
reflected the target audience of the Dang Lao Dong’s efforts. The Party 
considered the landless peasant as their main source of support when the time 
came to overthrow the upper ruling class in power. In later years the assessment 
conducted by the “conventional Western military” were discovered to have been 
very similar to the assessments made by the Dang Lao Dong. In examining the 
surveys the Dang Lao Dong conducted patterns emerged, and a methodology 
could be examined as to how the Party planned operations based on the survey 
information. Some of the key factors in assessing the targeted villages were how 
far away they were from lines of communications, and military bases. More 
isolated locations were selected first.  Analyzing the enemy presence in the 
targeted areas was extremely important. Other things considered were; 
movement patterns, strength levels, and reaction times of the government’s quick 
reaction force if fighting broke out.  
 Measures have been used fairly recently in Iraq and Afghanistan that are 
similar in concept and execution. LTC Baker’s article Decisive Weapon details 
how he conducted assessments based upon criteria of areas in order to begin to 
plan his approach towards gaining the populations assistance in defeating 
insurgents in his AOR.  
Once we appreciated the dynamics of the demographics in our AO, 
we found that we could easily fit Iraqi citizens into three broad 
categories: those who would never accept the Coalition’s presence 
in Iraq (religious fundamentalists, insurgents, terrorists); those who 
readily accepted the Coalition’s presence in Iraq (typically secular, 
Western-educated pragmatists); and the vast majority of Iraqis, who  
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were undecided. We referred to this last category as the silent 
majority and focused much of our information operations on 
influencing this group.49 
 One of the first steps upon arriving into the AOR is developing a culturally 
relevant survey instrument that will begin to help dissect the population. This is a 
topic that requires much additional research and examination. US military assets, 
expatriates, academics and anthropologist should be employed to help develop 
culturally effective surveys to understand the people of a selected AOR. Pre 
deployment research provides a vast amount of information but getting the 
understand of the ever changing dynamics of life at the micro level requires being 
there and talking to locals. Subject matter expertise is required to conduct the 
surveys as well as creating them. With the advent of the Human Terrain Teams 
(HTT) the military is contracting a cadre of academics, cultural experts and 
sociologists to help in crafting products and assist in soliciting the population for 
the information. More will be discussed later on concerning the role of the Human 
Terrain Teams in the conduct of Civil Reconnaissance. 
 The survey should be designed to extract relevant details that will provide 
commanders a level of understanding of who is in the area and what the present 
status and impressions are of specific aspects of the society. Surveys should be 
created individually based upon the region and targeted population. There are 
models used inside the military such as PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, 
Social, Infrastructure and Information) MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, 
Law Enforcement, Information, Finance, and Economic Elements), DIME 
(Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) and DIMEPC (Diplomatic, 
Information, Military, Economic, Paramilitary, Civic) that focus forces on 
information deemed relevant to counter insurgency warfare. There is also a layer 
of information that may seem meaningless at first but when placed with other 
data takes on significant relevance. Data such as the primary means of 
employment in the area, who are the richest civilians, who are the poorest, of 
                                            
49 Baker,. “Decisive Weapon,” 15. 
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which religious affiliation are the population, etc… Once this background 
information is complied it can help to confirm or deny other more significant data 
or can be used to help establish the community baseline from which anomalies 
can be seen. An example of this type of information might be the sudden 
unexplained rise in the number of cattle among poorer ethnically isolated 
members of a community that coincides with an increase on the use of IEDs in 
an area that previously never used them before. Unexplained changes in a 
community’s baseline can provide a starting point in tracking down insurgent 
influence and or sources of auxiliary support.    
 Figuring out how the surveys should be conducted is as important as the 
data collected. Gathering data should be done in a less formal manner than in 
the west, and done by locals and US military who have been trained if possible. 
Selecting the right people to conduct the survey is crucial. Open note taking 
might be discouraged in most cases. US forces should be familiar with the 
content of the survey to the point the information can be extracted during the 
course of casual conversation verses a formal interview. The best case scenario 
is working with a proficient translator or trained surrogate to help initiate 
conversation and allow the narrative of the local population to play out. Asking 
open ended questions that allow the individuals to explain answers verses simple 
yes and no is the ideal. The use of digital tape recording is a method of not only 
recording what’s being said for future reference and continuity but will allow 
translators to be more specific in translating the details after the meeting, 
subjects that would be inappropriate to bring up during the meeting. The cultural 
impact of all actions conducted in front of civilians needs to be considered before 
hand as much as possible. How they interpret what is said and done is the most 
important aspect of any exchanges. The collection of the proper data will take 
time and enormous effort. The time being taken should be seen as gathering 
data to help refine the civil operating picture or another opportunity to passively 
collect information while conducting the survey and providing locals with a 
positive impression of US forces. 
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3.  Operations After the Survey 
The first type of operation that should be considered after surveys are 
completed is a population control effort that entails creating identification cards 
for all residence in the battle space50. There is a huge need for much further 
study and research into the best practices of creating a national identification 
card system and a central database similar to the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC). A great effort should be applied to quickly accounting for 
everyone who lives and works within a units geographic responsibility. Through 
the use of biometrics, finger prints, and retinal scans, individuals cannot use 
culturally excepted aliases or false names to evade capture. This is a very 
delicate operation and will have to be completed over a period of time. Ideally the 
host nation government must be in support of this effort and most of the work to 
collect the data should be done by the national or local government with US 
technology in support. The cards must be of the national government symbology 
and be perceived as being done on their initiative. In doing this the United States 
can regain the technological advantage that has been lost to the enemy in its use 
of the internet and creation of IEDs. Government support for enforcing the 
possession of identification cards will make significant strides in forcing the 
insurgent further undercover or out of an area completely. Either way, the 
insurgents’ ability to conduct operations will be immediately effected. 
 If at the local level this cannot be accomplished using the establish 
government, an analysis should be done to examine the possibility of conducting 
such an operation by assets in place and with whatever resources are available. 
The ideal end state for this operation is to be able to connect the host nations to 
a central data warehouse that can be accessed by anyone with clearance in the 
country, in order to verify the identification and meta data of every individual in 
possession of a card.    
                                            
50 Class notes Guerilla Warfare 2006. 
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4.  Non-Violent Direct Action 
 After entering into the area of operations the imperative becomes learning 
as much as possible about the people and activities: this effort  encompasses the 
direct involvement of Soldiers with civilians in order to develop rapport and 
facilitate the passing of information. The operations must be designed in such a 
way as to give the perception that the populations involvement is voluntary and 
not forced through the threat of violence thus the term, non violent direct action. 
US forces we get into the communities and military planners create missions with 
the specific intent of learning and absorbing as much as possible about the 
community and its people.   These types of operations should be conducted with 
information gathering assets in concert such as ASOT (Advanced Special 
Operations Teams) and eavesdropping capabilities in order to get the maximum 
benefit out of the effort. If the presence of military in the community has any 
effect at all it will provide cause for insurgents and insurgent sympathizers to 
potentially communicate with each other and provide us with more information for 
better analysis of who is who in the AOR. The COMINT (Communication 
Intelligence) potential is huge if done as a part of the operation and is positioned 
outside of the view or knowledge of locals and insurgents. 
 The primary concern during these types of interactions is to provide a level 
of security to civilians who are interacting with soldiers. Understanding that the 
insurgent can find out who talked to soldiers and what was said, especially if he 
is among the civilians that are interacting with counter insurgent forces is 
imperative. When creating opportunities to talk attention needs to be paid to the 
ability of others to hear what is being said and who can witness the interaction. 
Controlling for the audience and venue in which interactions take place is critical 
in creating the right environment for civilians to pass information to soldiers.  
 The overall purpose for the mission should not be lost by focusing on the 
method being utilized to interact with locals.  In short, the mission is not the 
distribution of humanitarian aide; it is an opportunity to communicate with the 
local population. Presently many soldier become confused as to what is being 
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done and why when it comes to Civil Affairs operations. Not understanding the 
purpose of operations that involve the interaction of civilians with military causes 
problems, and could be counter productive to long term mission success. As 
recognized by Mao when he created his Eight Points of Attention, every soldier’s 
behavior is extremely important on missions of this nature. All eight of his point 
go to the heart of how soldiers should interact with every civilian they come in 
contact with.51 If a soldier standing guard during a rapport building operation 
mistreats children, becomes angry, or appears unapproachable it may have an 
effect on the population that stops the flow of information and makes the 
operation appear hypocritical. If a unit is trying to build good will and soldiers end 
up barking at kids or throwing rocks at animals because they are bored, it serves 
to hamper efforts. Soldier’s behavior during these types of operations is 
extremely important and should be understood at the lowest level. Information 
may be given to any soldier at any time from anyone in the community. All 
members of the mission need to be intimately read in on what is going on and 
what is happening, everyone is a sensor on these missions.  
 The following operations are suggested methods to structure activities that 
lend to the collection of civil information. These are not doctrinal but based on the 
examination of a few operational and tactical level designs that have worked for 
units in the past. This is not an all-inclusive list but only a starting point to gain 
momentum for further designs. Creativity in designing, planning and executing 
these type of operations is more important than creating a template that can be 
repeated by other forces else where. Every territory and its people are different.  
                                            
51 Mao’s Eight Points of Attention; speak politely, pay fairly for what you buy, return 
everything you borrow, pay for anything you damage, do not hit or swear at people, do not 
damage crops, do not take liberties with women, do not ill treat captives. 
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5.  Rapport Building Operations 
It is imperative to earn the trust and confidence of the indigenous 
population in your AO. They might never “like” you, but…you can 
earn their respect.52 
 Rapport building is the essential element in creating an environment for 
locals to begin to provide meaningful civil information. Captain Lawrence put it 
best, ”Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too 
intimate, too prominent, or too earnest.”53 To obtain this level of rapport is difficult 
and takes time, their version of time not the Western concept of it. These types of 
operations will be conducted more often than other Civil Affairs Operations 
(CAO) or Civil Military Operation (CMO).  Without a feeling of trust or the building 
of rapport locals will not feel comfortable interacting with soldiers and foreigners 
and information flow will be limited or non existent. Rapport building operations 
need to be culturally specific and well thought out and designed. In the counter 
insurgency game rapport takes a long time to build but can be lost with little 
effort, cultural mistakes, making promises that cannot be kept and being 
impatient are just a few of the culprits in loosing rapport. Factors that work 
against building rapport are; lack of cultural understanding, time of deployment 
rotations, bad first impressions by others and expectation management. An entire 
thesis could be devoted to this very important topic but in the interest of brevity 
only a few issues will be addressed. 
 Lack of cultural understanding is an ongoing battle that must be focused 
on throughout a Civil Affairs Soldiers time on active duty. Never feel comfortable 
enough in a foreign culture that focus is lost and assumptions are made. Soldiers 
get lazy and inadvertently cross a line setting back efforts. Get to know the  
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culture especially the taboos and stay away from them. The generic rules of 
cultural engagement do not speak of sex, politics or religion, seem to work when 
there is little to no base of knowledge.  
We constantly strove to earn the trust and confidence of the Iraqis 
in our area by consistently being truthful with them and following 
through on our word.54 
 There is nothing that can be done to change the length of deployments, 
that is something beyond the tactical and strategic span of control. A significant 
factor that arises from transition during deployments is how to transition local 
points of contact to the unit conducting the relief in place. This process needs to 
be thought through and planned for as much as possible. Losing data and 
institutional knowledge that was collected during a rotation can be limited with 
using the ASK software but personal ties that take time to grow are what suffers 
the most. Understanding that the inhabitants of the country are not required to 
adapt or change but the soldiers trying to obtain their support and assistance are. 
 Fixing problems that were caused by others takes time and a consistent 
demonstration of performance.  American soldiers have difficulty in judging the 
amount of time that is needed by foreign nationals to feel comfortable in speaking 
to members of other cultures, and often times become frustrated and demanding 
attitudes which can potentially ruin the US ability to gain information. Soldiers 
who are not trained in cross cultural communication and attempt to enter into a 
relationship without spending the time and effort needed to build rapport could 
affect all efforts after their rotation. Depending on the civilians and their level of 
comfort, building the needed level of rapport could take significant portions of 
time but is necessary due to the protracted nature of insurgency.  
 The expectation of US forces and their capabilities is a factor when 
interacting with local nationals. “If you Americans are capable of putting a man on 
the moon, why can’t you get the electricity to come on…”55 is a prevalent feeling 
                                            
54 Baker, 24. 
55 Baker, 19. 
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in most third world countries. Getting control of expectations starts from the very 
first interaction with local nationals. Never allow the expectation to get ahead of 
capabilities,  
…we were met with enormously unrealistic expectations that we 
had to manage and were simply unable to gratify in a timely 
manner. Such expectations grew out of Coalition pronouncements 
before Soldiers arrived that extolled how much better off the 
average Iraqi citizen’s life was going to be when Saddam and his 
regime were gone. The concept of ‘better’ proved to be a terrible 
cultural misperception on our part…56 
 All operations have the potential to build rapport as well as destroy it. 
Some examples of operations designed to specifically build rapport are centered 
on the needs and cultural sensitivities of the local population.  
There is a direct correlation between our credibility and our ability to 
demonstrably improve the quality of life, physical security, and 
stability in a society.57  
 Infantry and Special Forces handle the physical security Civil Affairs 
tackles the quality of life and stability aspect of rapport building. Many times 
these aspects intermesh and are by no means exclusive, but identifying who is 
responsible for what helps make the load manageable. Examples of effective 
quality of life type operations that proved successful in Afghanistan were the 
distribution of wood and charcoal bricks to rural families during the winter. Food 
is often a welcome aspect but keeping people warm in the winter and cool in the 
summer goes a long way to demonstrate concern for the health and welfare of a 
target audience. MEDCAPS (Medical Civil Action Program), VETCAPs 
(Veterinarian Civil Action Program)  and DENTACPs (Dental Civil Action 
Program) are all examples of rapport building type operations.  
                                            
56 Ibid, 19. 
57 Ibid. 
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We came to realize that any chance of success with information 
operations was specifically tied to immediate, visible actions to 
improve the average Iraqi’s quality of life.58 
6.  Drawing Operations-  
 Drawing operations are operations conducted with the goal of drawing 
large numbers locals to interact with US forces. These operations may take on 
different forms but have the same desired end state, create an opportunity for 
local nationals to interact with soldiers. Creating an environment during these 
operations that allow for privacy in order for local nationals to pass along 
information proves valuable. There are several reasons to conduct these 
operations.  
 Drawing and interacting with a large numbers of people hinders the 
insurgents ability to identify who passed information to US forces. Counter 
insurgency forces can create an environment to meet with individuals and 
interact with them on a short term basis to pass information or plan a more 
lengthy interaction at another time. Many times this type of information can be 
exchanged while distributing humanitarian assistance, during the conduct of a 
medical examination, or in the course of treating their livestock. These 
opportunities must be designed to allow time away from the eyes of a community 
in order to provide the best possible security to the individual and his or her 
family.  
 An example of drawing operations was conducted successfully by Civil 
Affairs teams in Orgun-E Afghanistan and continues today. Upon initially arriving 
into Orgun-E a destroyed and neglected warehouse was identified as a location 
to store and distribute incoming humanitarian assistance (HA) items (food, 
blankets, radios, etc…). It was during the distributions of HA that the locals had 
their pictures taken, asked a few questions and given information within just few 
moments of being alone with soldiers in the warehouse. The mission was 
                                            
58 Baker, 19. 
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designed to incorporate other coalition forces in order to provide an 
eavesdropping net and security on the warehouse prior to announcing a specific 
date and time of the distribution operation. Announcing the date and time would 
hopefully draw out any insurgents from the community before hand to attempt to 
attack the warehouse or plant improvised explosives to detonate during the 
operation in order to kill civilians seen interacting with US military. Additionally 
with the eavesdropping net established over the town communications regarding 
any activities related to the distribution could be monitored in order to identify 
insurgents and gain an understanding of who the insurgents are and the size and 
location of their network. Occasionally the efforts paid off and plans were 
discovered before hand and insurgents were caught conducting a 
reconnaissance of the warehouse in preparation for attacks.  
 During the course of the distribution locals that arrived at the warehouse 
and were told they would be receiving the supplies individually and they would 
need to enter into the warehouse in order to help pack the items. It was during 
these brief moments behind the walls of the warehouse that the individual was 
photographed, biometrics were taken and casual conversation was struck that 
resulted in a more detailed understanding of the human terrain. Individuals 
effectively answered a survey of questions developed before hand during the 
course of conversation while loading supplies on pack animals or gathering the 
items in bundles to carry.  The information was gathered away from the site an 
hearing of others who were waiting in line and conducted in a manner that was 
more reflective of a conversation than a formal questioning. These short but 
effective conversations resulted in a large portion of the community providing a 
significant amount of detail to the civil terrain and began the interaction with 
specific locals and the building of rapport and trust. Some information on 
insurgents is always provided, whether the information results in the identification 
of a particular insurgent or observations of things happening in the community it 
all adds clarity to the understanding of the operational environment.     
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 There are other tactical benefits for conducting Drawing Operations, 
specifically, preventing civilian interference during the course of combat or 
intelligence collecting operations. Drawing a large crowd away from the area of 
an attack could potential help prevent the loss of civilian life and collateral 
damage. Announcing these types of activities to the civilian population provides a 
kind of honey pot for insurgents to communicate to each other about or possibly 
makes plans to attack or threaten locals before hand, doing this puts the enemy 
into a reaction mode verses planning operations against US forces. If intelligence 
collection assets are in position prior to operations a net can be established to 
help intercept communications and help identify insurgents that might be 
interested in information on US forces. Lastly, these operations are another 
opportunity to build rapport and help demonstrate the best face of the counter 
insurgent forces. 
7. Emersion Operations 
 Emersion operations are designed to get soldiers into the villages and 
towns for a period of time in order to observe and gain situational awareness. 
Emersion will provide a limited opportunity to interact with local nationals and 
observe daily life. In the course of living among a target population relationships 
can be created and others fostered to help strengthen ties among supporters. 
Sharing the hazards of living amongst a targeted population boosts the 
confidence of locals as well as demonstrates unity. The best situation possible is 
a unit or individuals to be invited to remain overnight or for a few days by a local 
leader in of the area. In being invited several hurdles will be bypassed and a local 
face will be put to an invitation verse an uninvited bunch of soldiers moving in to 
hopefully draw a fight. Spending an extended amount of time among the local 
population provides an enormous information gathering opportunity. The more 
intelligence assets that can help in collecting information during the emersion the 
better the time spent.  
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8.  Network Building Operations 
 Network building operations are designed to create counter insurgency 
networks from among civil organizations in the population.  The end state of this 
effort is to create small groups who are motivated to fight against insurgents 
within their own neighborhoods. By building small networked groups, based upon 
preexisting civil and social organizations, to help collect information or report 
suspicious activities counter insurgency forces increase their information and 
security networks from within the population.  There are several techniques to 
accomplishing this task, 
 The groups might not directly seek out or report on insurgents but provide 
information that can further enhance the civil terrain or identify insurgent support 
networks. An example of this type of operation might be; bringing together the 
local business owners in an area and creating an environment where they 
understand how insurgent activities or an insurgent victory could effect their 
interests and livelihoods.  Any civic organization in a community might be helpful 
in this effort; farmers, women’s groups, youth groups or informal social groups. 
Helping to support local governance by bringing together people of a like interest 
creates a web of networks and civil organizations that counter insurgent efforts 
and strengthen communities.  
 Opportunities to be apart of meetings of local leadership or security forces 
is a high value effort. Bringing other members of the community to witness what 
goes on during the meetings is another potential opportunity to spread counter 
insurgent fervor and create networks. If leaders and elders are seen working with 
US forces while representing their constituency it allows for word of mouth to do 
rapport building from within a society. Asking the local leaders to bring in a 
different member of their community every meeting to observe adds another 
dimension to the proceedings and allows for social networks among citizens to 
begin. Additionally it provides another opportunity to interact with a section of the 
population in another venue.   
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D. POST DEPLOYMENT PHASE  
 Post deployment operations center primarily on Civil Information 
Management (CIM)59 which will be discussed at length in another chapter. This 
phase begins as units begin to prepare for relief in place operations. This phase 
involves the updating, cataloging and warehousing of civil information in order to 
pass it on to the follow on unit.  More vital than the data is the passing along of 
contacts and area familiarization. This portion of most deployments is the area of 
most vulnerability to counter insurgency forces. The relationships that have taken 
months to establish and foster are now coming to an end and must be 
transitioned to replacements as nearly intact as possible. The complexities of 
working in a cross cultural environment, by, with, and through the local 
population, makes the cycle of changing counter insurgent forces problematic at 
best. 
 The focus of this effort initially should be in communicating with the 
arriving unit and specifically with the Civil Affairs counterpart handling the Civil 
Common Operating Picture in order to provide as much information as possible 
before deployment. The temporal, relational and geospatial information is the 
bulk of the data but the personalities, complexities and nuisances need to be 
portrayed as much as possible as well. One of the big difficulties in conducting 
the RIP is the rotating units don’t know each other and have no opportunities to 
gain an understanding of the ability or level of knowledge or experiences of the 
incoming team. Part of the Pre Mission activities of the incoming unit is to gain 
familiarity with the operational environment during the Pre-Deployment Site  
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entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher 
headquarters, other USG/DoD agencies, and international organizations and NGOs to ensure the 
timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both the raw 




Survey (PDSS). As discussed in the Pre Deployment Preparation section of this 
chapter any opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of the environment is 
critical.    
 Once the unit arrives to conduct the RIP all operations in the community 
are forced to a temporary halt if conditions have not been set to make for a 
smooth transition. As discussed in previous chapters, surveys are the best 
method to get to understand a community. A suggestion for RIP operations is the 
consideration of conducting joint surveys of the population with the members of 
the incoming and outgoing unit as part of the RIP. This would provide for several 
things; updating information and keeping a finger on the pulse of the population, 
provide a vehicle to familiarize the incoming unit with the population, and 
demonstrate to the community the determination to outlast insurgents. 
Conducting a door to door survey in some areas especially urban environments 
might be impossible especially in the short window available during RIP 
operations but activities that could achieve the same end state might be able to 
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V. WHAT INFORMATION TO COLLECT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The focus of civil reconnaissance efforts should center on collecting 
geospatial, relational and temporal information. Integrating data collection and 
analysis across these layers puts counter insurgent forces in a better position 
to understand the operational environment and see the rich tapestry of the 
human terrain. The methodology begins with the examination of the geospatial 
dimensions of an area of responsibility with the goal of understanding the 
physical environment in as much detail as possible. The second step is the 
layering of socio-cultural dimension or relational data to the physical terrain to 
indicate where people are, and what relationships exist. The final layer is the 
temporal dimension, which will depict the evolution of relationships in a specific 
geographic area and offer clues as to how they will continue to evolve in the 
future.  
B. GEOSPTIAL 
Knowledge of the terrain and population provides commanders with 
an understanding of how to select the time and location for future 
operations, as well as the tactics to be employed.60 
1. Introduction 
 Gaining spatial awareness of an area of operations helps focus counter 
insurgent forces, and quickly identify the relevance of activities and civil 
information. Geospatial information is data that can be superimposed onto maps 
to visually depict information that has a geographic relevance. The primary 
means of collecting, analyzing and depicting geospatial information is the 
Geographic Information System (GIS).  Merging civil information with geospatial 
information provides a visual representation of the human terrain. In combining 
                                            
60 Brian Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” Parameters 
Summer (2007): 28.  
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these pieces of data more information becomes apparent about the population 
and insurgents. Understanding the physical environment helps to close the 
information gap that exists between insurgents and counter insurgents.  
The term “geospatial intelligence” means- “ the exploitation and 
analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, 
and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced 
activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery 
intelligence, and geospatial information.”61  
2. Geographic Information System 
 GIS is many things; a science, a tool, and software application all in one. 
The science of GIS is the understanding of the earth surface and all the aspects 
of mapping it. This portion of GIS is very technical and precise. Geography, 
Cartography, Remote Sensing, Surveying, Geodesy, Statistics, Computer 
Science and Mathematics all contribute aspects to the creation of the software 
that result in highly accurate and detailed geospatial representations.  The quality 
of the information extracted from the use of GIS relates to the quality of the 
information provided and from the analyst’s ability to visually depict the data. If 
the base maps or satellite images used are flawed or improperly displayed the 
value of the information is in lessened. GIS functioning as a tool strives to merge 
mapping and database management to produce more than just a two 
dimensional map, but a model rich in information. GIS’s role as a software is the 
point the science meets the functionality of the tool, and the information provided 
can be manipulated and graphically represented in order to conduct spatial 
analysis.62  
                                            
61 Geospatial Intelligence Basic Doctrine, National Geospatial Intelligence Office, Publication 
1-0, September 2006.  
62 Dr. Arlene Guest, “Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems” class notes, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007.  
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3. Components of GIS 
 The GIS is the integration of five components; people, data, procedures, 
hardware, and software. All components must be present and functioning in 
order for GIS to operate effectively.63 The higher the quality of the individual 
components the more utility GIS can be to the counter insurgent fight.  
 The people component of GIS are the collectors of the raw data and the 
analyst that input and manipulate the information. GIS is not user friendly, it is 
quirky and is constantly being updated, so remaining proficient in all of its many 
functionalities is a task in and of itself. If the very perishable skill of operating GIS 
is not exercised with regularity the value of the tool is diminished. GIS 
conferences are conducted virtually everywhere in the world by the company that 
created the software Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) to help 
keep operators current on developments with the software. ESRI works closely 
with the Special Operations community and strives to make the software relevant 
to the counter insurgent fight and modern day battlefield. Of all the components 
of GIS the operators are the most important since they take time to make and 
become proficient in the use of the software.  
 The type and quality of the data inputted into the software will determine 
the quality of the output. There are essentially three types of geographic data; 
spatial data  (where something is), attribute data (what something is), and time 
(when something was something or somewhere).64 Some of the sources of data 
are paper maps, GPS input, digital data and satellite information. In addition to 
geospatial related data. Databases and spreadsheets can be incorporated to 
maximize data input and analysis capacity. Pictures and videos can also be 
linked to data on maps to provide a multi media presentation of data. The more 
detailed information input to the system the higher the quality of the model that  
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can be produced. Raw data placed into the proper format will allow for the 
maximum utility of the software. When dealing with mapping and map making 
precision is the key to success.   
 When using the software to visually represent data against a base map a 
high level of attention to procedure is required. The software is extremely rigid in 
the procedure for uploading data and strives to ensure the necessary metrics are 
applied to maintain accuracy. After understanding the science that applies to the 
data and map making, understanding procedures is the primary focus of GIS 
operators.  
 The software can’t exist without the proper hardware. Present day off the 
shelf computers possess the needed hardware, memory and speed to perform all 
the functions of the GIS software. The best utilization of the GIS is if it used on a 
network of other computers collecting similar information.  In tracking and fighting 
insurgents networking GIS capabilities is essential. The enemy often times is not 
constrained to the geographic boundaries counter insurgent forces recognize and 
understands that part of his strength is to operate in several areas 
simultaneously. If we don’t understand the terrain of our own AOR as well as the 
units adjacent to our own we stand a great chance of allowing the enemy free 
reign. Understanding the complete picture of the civil terrain will help in making 
the activities of the insurgent more apparent.  
4.  GIS Relevance to COIN 
 GIS software provides for several key functions; capture, store, query, 
analyze, and displays information. Through these functions information can be 
manipulated to gain better insight into the population and further understanding 
of the civil domain. One of the advantages of being able to use spatial and 
attribute data together is the ability to code large amounts of information very 
quickly in order to visually depict an area. Entire neighborhoods and populated 
areas can be surveyed and the data collected can be attributed to locations 
quickly. This speed and accuracy of understanding the physical environment is 
essential in defeating the insurgents information advantage. As features are 
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created on a map, data tables exist to further enhance the information about the 
feature. An example is collecting the location of residences and business (special 
data) inside an area of operations and then linking information about the location 
(attribute data) to provide details on who occupies the location, pictures of the 
individuals, background data and so on. Entire target packages and historical 
record can be created using GIS.  
 Once the special and attribute data are properly entered into the software 
queries of the data can be done to create different overlays that can be placed 
against a base map to understand the population. Features can be identified 
based upon attributes and information can be gleaned to layering the information 
on top of each other to identify trends and correlations. An example is plotting 
IED explosions and layering the locations of residence to see who was the 
closest house to the blast sight. This provides counter insurgent forces with a 
place to start investigating to see if they saw when the IED was emplaced, heard 
insurgent operating in the area, etc. Additionally the geographic component can 
help identify likely positions from which a remotely controlled improvised 
explosive devices (RCIED) could have been detonated given the strength of the 
frequency and the type of detonating device used. In developing the details, 
operations can be crafted to help to understand the template for IED set up and 
detonation that could be used throughout the theater.   
 The primary purpose of using GIS as it relates to civil information in the 
COIN environment is to help organize data and visually depict it quickly over a 
network to reduce the information gap the enemy has over counter insurgency 
forces. Having the ability to analyze both special and attribute data 
simultaneously provides a strong tool for analysts to gain situation awareness 
quickly.   
 With this tool and its vast ability to manipulate data comes the difficulty in 
standardizing the processes and encompassing all the various scenarios 
possible. Since this aspect of civil information is very important great attention to 
establishing as coherent as possible a format is required and a procedural 
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checklist is needed to standardize data collection, input, and representation. With 
the transition of units the one constant needs is knowledge of the area. Creating 
a SOP or Codebook that details how to enter the data and what the standard 
should be is the next step. The difficulty initially will be in creating a format and 
SOP broad enough to capture as much of the process as possible. Immediately 
after the SOP is written changes based upon utilization or developments in the 
technology will begin to take place. How the force will train on this software, 
maintain proficiency and keep up with changes will be a daunting task. If a 
priority is not placed on using this type data will continue to exist in unconnected 
plains and formats never to be linked to anything relevant or actionable. Forces 
will continue to be victim of the enemy’s informational advantage. 
C. RELATIONAL 
No longer can analysts use just an organizational chart to describe 
an enemy’s configuration. Today it is much more difficult for a 
commander to differentiate the enemy from members of the general 
populace. The commander can no longer expect to face a single, 
consistent leader running a subordinate organization exhibiting a 
coherent pattern of activity.65 
1. Introduction 
 The purpose of conducting social network analysis (SNA) of the civil 
environment is to understand the people and networks within a population. 
Gaining an awareness of the networks in an operating environment using SNA 
will produce significant amounts of information of both the population and the 
enemy.  Understanding the relationship the insurgent has with the local 
population provides planners the sort of information needed in order to make 
effective plans. Once there is an understanding of who is who and how they 
relate, or the presence of a baseline, anomalies begin to become more visible. 
The presence of hidden or dark networks will begin to emerge. 
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 The modern insurgency is characterized by non-state actors, linked by 
pre-existing ties (religion, family, or tribe) that are adapted to support insurgent 
warfare.66 Understanding these ties and what there strengths and weaknesses 
are is the first step in destroying an insurgent network.  
In the Global War on Terrorism, one of the greatest challenges 
facing the United States is the opposition of a fully mobilized, 
traditionally networked, tribalized enemy. This opposition is 
reflected in an insurgency that possesses an unassailable base 
immune from direct attack. This unassailable base is itself the 
social network, merging and diverging as the situation dictates.67 
2.  Utilizing SNA  
 The primary purpose of SNA in COIN is to visualize the relationship 
between actors and uncover whatever structure exists. This probative analysis of 
the enemies networks based upon civil information not only removes the 
insurgents cover and concealment but also erodes the information advantage of 
the cultural and civil information that he uses to defeat US forces. Analysis of the 
civil environment should start with an effort to understand the ties that exist 
independent of the conflict. Preexisting ties are the conduit for persons of like 
interests and experience to organize into groups that share a common ideology 
or goals. Understanding who belongs to preexisting networks provides 
counterinsurgent forces an excellent place to begin to look for other insurgents or 
supporters.   Tribal societies already have affiliated social, economic, and military 
networks easily adaptable to war fighting. The methods by which insurgents are 
exploiting tribal networks does not represent an evolved form of insurgency, but 
rather, it is an expression of inherent cultural and social customs.68 Kinship ties, 
be they of blood or brotherhood, are a fundamental aspect of many terrorist, 
criminal, and gang organizations.69 
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 Enemy information could be better understood and have more depth if 
layered against civil information in order to help identify preexisting ties. 
Understanding these ties will aide in discovering information about whom else 
might be involved in activities or might aide insurgents. Most efforts to hunt 
insurgents center on analysis of enemy information and networks These are 
pieces to a larger tapestry and could be better understood if placed into context. 
SNA provides a social and relational context to better understand, effect, and 
even predict, who might be insurgents from within preexisting relationships and 
networks.   
 Once the networks have been visually depicted, next comes examining 
the factors that influence the relationships between individuals and gaining an 
understanding of the nature and strength of the ties. Understanding why 
relationships exist between actors and how actors interact, counter insurgency 
forces are afforded a window into the inner workings of the network.70 
Understanding the links of a network are as important as understanding the 
characteristics of the individuals in the network. While pre-existing ties are the 
foundation, it is a common interest…that serves as the catalysts for creating a 
collective identity that allows a group to embrace collective action.”71 For 
example, news about Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network reveal their 
dependence on personal relationships formed over the years with “Afghan Arabs” 
from Egypt and elsewhere who were committed to Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism against the United States.72 The common interest of Islamic jihad 
superseded preexisting relationships that helped to network fighters together 
from different parts of the word but once a member of the network it provided 
qualification   for membership into other jihadists insurgencies.   
 Once the network has been analyzed, strategies can be developed to 
affect the network. The end result of effective SNA is knowledge based upon 
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information and intelligence that provides for the development of a plan of attack. 
We can now begin to see the enemy. Having conducted an effective SNA of the 
enemy using civil information US forces will be in a better position to utilize our 
superior direct action capability to interdict at our choosing verses whenever the 
enemy attacks.  
Attacking these networks can be extremely difficult. Defeating a 
networked enemy requires a capability that possesses an array of 
linked resources necessary to sustain it. Conventional military 
thinking and strategies do not always permit such a response.73  
 SNA is not something easily trained and is a perishable skill that is more 
characteristic of tracking weather patterns than that of describing a static display. 
This method of peeling back layers to get at the heart of networks is time 
consuming and often counter intuitive,74 but in modeling these networks effective 
methods of how to take them apart become more apparent. Civil information 
provides the base line from which other analysis can begin to take place. If we 
don’t understand who is who and how they relate then we are not getting the full 
picture.  
a. Overt Networks 
SNA of overt networks in a population will reveal much about the 
enemy that the billion dollar satellites are incapable of. Face to face contact with 
civilians on a large scale has an effect on the enemy. With more interaction 
comes more information, and with more information the less room insurgents 
have to hide. Understanding whom in a community has influence, legitimate 
leadership, and control is similar to identifying key terrain in preparation for battle. 
Who controls those pieces of key terrain will dominate a battle space. Those who 
are in favor and have influence over the key individuals in an area stand a better 
chance at swaying public opinion and influencing perception. In understanding 
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this critical concept soldiers and analysts can begin to predict who the enemy will 
target for influence operations. Efforts can be made to observe these people or 
actively engage them before the enemy in order to deprive them of that persons 
influence. It can also translate into the manifestation of operations that target 
watching those selected individuals residence and workplace to see who comes 
and goes, when and with what frequency. The desire to control these types of 
individuals will draw the enemy to these key people thus making him vulnerable.   
 SNA will help identify networks and individuals that are susceptible to 
being influenced or recruited by insurgent forces. The communist Vietnamese 
would identify popular youth as possible sources for recruitment when surveying 
a village for Communist take over, with the understanding that if certain 
individuals were recruited others would follow more easily.75 Survey teams also 
identified those that were in trouble with the law and had reason to take issue 
with the current established government as potential recruits.76 Using SNA to 
Identify theses sorts of individuals before insurgent recruitment efforts are 
applied could be extremely helpful in stopping the flow of new members.   
 Effective SNA will reveal the means the enemy communicates with the 
population. In the course of conducting Civil Reconnaissance how the civilian 
population has come to understand the enemy will become apparent. In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban’s preferred method of communication is the “Night 
Letter” in Vietnam communist infiltrated villages at night and conducted visits of 
targeted locals to influence and intimidate. The tactics the enemy uses to 
communicate is a vulnerability and critical information.  
 In understanding the overt networks of a population, methods the 
insurgent uses to resource himself become apparent. A practical example of this 
can be found in Afghanistan. Due to the countries extreme isolation and terrain 
there is only one gas station in some places for miles, and in order to get out of 
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town people must stop there when either coming or going. This fact makes the 
gas station network critical. Understanding who works there what they see and 
gaining an understanding for their loyalties could be significant in creating a 
“choke point” for the enemy. Observing who comes and goes at this location 
could yield significant information to counter insurgent forces and further hinder 
insurgent’s ability to operate in the open.   
 Understanding the major issues locals have with the established 
government can lead to the heading off of insurgent propaganda and ideology. 
Issues that are very apparent to locals and people of the region may not be to 
counter insurgent forces. These complaints and issues are the fuel which 
insurgent will use to mobilize and influence disgruntled citizens into supporting 
their effort. Understanding how the enemy puts form to the struggle and his 
ideology is critical in defeating it.   
 The military presently utilizes several different software packages to help 
conduct a limited version of SNA. Software such as Analyst Notebook were a 
great starting point but in order to get the fullest benefit from the information and 
the ability to manipulate it to the fullest extent, upgrades and training are 
desperately needed. SNA needs to be a part of training beyond the walls of the 
intelligence community. Insurgencies are fought at the lowest level with thinking 
and innovative leadership. Relying on a distant headquarters to conduct analysis 
of a population and be able to understand the complexities and nuances of its 
people is foolish. This is an opportunity for the Civil Affairs community to fill a gap 
in capabilities that the military is suffering from.  Training on SNA packages that 
can integrate with the SOF community is the ideal. Software is only the tool for 
organizing and analyzing data, the strength of the analysis is only as good as the 
information that is gathered. The focus of the SNA effort should be placed on 
effective gathering techniques and coming up with creative solutions to bypass 
cultural and political obstacles to get at ground truth information. 
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b. Steps in Conducting Analysis 
Before and during the coding of information a codebook of clear 
definitions needs to be established. This codebook is essential for several 
reasons; prevent confusion in terms, assist in the longevity of the data to other 
analyst, help others interpret the data outside of the creators and their 
organization. Presently the military utilizes several different SNA software 
packages with no synchronization or continuity of how data is entered, what it 
means or its significance. This drop off in the life of the data equates to fighting 
the first rotation into country every time a new unit comes in. The military has 
built a very limited and unstructured method of conducting relief in place missions 
that has hindered the forward progress of counter insurgency forces. The 
presence of a codebook is the first step in rectifying the situation. The document 
is ever evolving as new information is presented or new networks discovered. 
Codebooks are the key to unlock the value of conducting SNA. 
(1)  Describe the context of the network- Deciding on the scope 
or level of the analysis with as much detail as possible is the first step in 
preparing to conduct SNA. In the COIN environment at the operational and 
tactical level, analysis of the civil environment will start with understanding who is 
in a selected geographic location. This area could be as large as cities or as 
small as a few houses or small village. Once the area has been surveyed more 
specific layers like business networks or religious networks, whatever is deem 
appropriate  can be examined more closely based upon the situation. What is 
important is defining the scope of the analysis before beginning or designing 
operations to collect the data.  Ultimately the strength of SNA in COIN operations 
is the ability to map as many different networks as possible and then merge the 
models to examine the characteristics of the network. 
(2) Translation of data into a matrix- Translating the data 
collected into a matrix is the point information begins to be dissected. Creating a 
one or two mode matrix or a simple relational matrix needs to be determined 
before sifting through the information to find relationships begins. Without going 
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into the specifics about how to construct matrix for analysis the decision on how 
to organize the model and what to visualize is important; getting it wrong will cost 
time and effort.  
(3) Depict the network visually- Once the data has been loaded, 
the networks can be visually depicted. Selecting the different variations or types 
of methods of depicting a network will only enhance the information and provide 
different perspectives.   
(4) Apply matrices to the network- Once the various networks 
have been created the true value of SNA can be understood, by merging 
different models together to identify key nodes and relationships. As networks 
are merged together to reveal characteristics and trends the enemy’s cover and 
concealment begins to disappear.  
(5) Analysis of the network- Applying the academic analysis to  
the network will bring to the surface details that visual inspection don’t 
necessarily make apparent. Understanding the academic measures that could be 
applied to a network requires a more than casual understanding of SNA. Entire 
fields of education are dedicated to understanding the terms and methods of 
looking at the data, and speaks to why a SNA trained soldier is necessary to get 
the best out of the data. Using SNA software allows analysts to move the model 
around and get at different perspectives. Picking out key nodes and where cut off 
points exists are easy to see.  
(6) Develop strategy- Once the models have been analyzed and 
different models placed together different methods of attacking a network can be 
analyzed. In most SNA software the ability to remove nodes and links to nodes is 
available and will provide a model of how networks will restructure in wake of the 
removal of one or several nodes. This is the goal of SNA is to provide planners 
with suggestions and methods to destroying insurgent networks. 
Social Network Analysis is only a tool and has inherent faults. 
Quantitative analysis of any data possesses inherent problems. The models 
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created are only as good as the information provided. The uncertainty of the 
scope of a network is always a concern. As with any study of human 
relationships and social sciences, dealing with the unpredictability of human 
beings causes much apprehension in placing lots of confidence in the data once 
it is presented. The more a result of SNA is counter intuitive the more resistance 
will be encountered. Even with the many flaws of SNA it still remains the process 
that strives to reveal the relationships that insurgents use to conduct 
operations.77  
D. TEMPORAL 
The temporal aspect of civil information is extremely critical to 
understanding the significance of events in the context of time. Upon first 
observation, this may seem the most insignificant aspect used to understand the 
civil environment, but in most cases it permeates the relevance of all other 
aspects of analysis.  Using the temporal aspect to help ultimately predict 
occurrences or examine when conditions are right for events to happen is just 
one of the goals of temporal analysis. Although seemingly insignificant by itself 
when layered against relational and geospatial data understanding when an 
event occurred is an essential element in determining when it may happen again. 
In breaking into the enemy’s decision cycle we can begin to examine his routines 
and breakdown the times when conditions are ripe for his success and move to 
interdict them. Examples of the relevance of time can be seen in the rise in 
attacks during the time of Ramadan in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ramadan is also a 
major cultural event for all Muslims throughout the world and will be recognized 
by all those working with Muslims as a time when fasting and minimal physical 
action is taken. Another example is the harvesting season is for poppy plants in 
Afghanistan. Harvest will draw Taliban merchants from their hiding place in order 
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to obtain the plants for refinement into heroine which finances a large portion of 
Taliban and AQ activities in the country. Knowing when is as relevant as knowing  
the who, where and why. Both GIS and most Network analysis software such as 
Analyst Notebook have temporal components to aide and keep track of events 
along a time continuum.   
E. SUMMARY 
In having provided an overview of the three aspects of civil information the 
question of what is to be collected becomes more clear. Under geospatial 
information items to be collected are spatial data, attribute data and time.  
Understanding where something is, what something is and when it was 
something or somewhere provide a strong level of analysis. Under relational or 
socio-cultural data critical pieces of information to focus on are; the people and 
the relationships they share with each other. Understanding the individual and 
why they behave the way they do as well as the relationships they have creates 
a baseline that begins to reveal anomalies. These anomalies are persons or 
people who are operating outside of the norm and deserve further attention to 
explain their behavior. This is the essence of identifying who are the insurgents 
within the population. Understand the relationships and the networks will begin to 
be understood. The temporal aspect of civil information is as simple as it is 
powerful. Understanding when something took place is a significant factor in 
understanding why it happened and what conditions caused it to happen. Once 
this data is collected analysis will reveal conditions under which it could happen 
again. Knowing this level of detail provides a certain capacity to predict, that 
could prevent future surprise.  
F. CONCLUSION 
If used effectively these level of analysis should provide a detailed picture 
of the human terrain and indicators for the allocation ISR and civil 
reconnaissance resources. Gathering this information takes a significant amount 
of time and patience. Large amounts of the information are not static but change, 
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and keeping aware of the changes is just as daunting as gathering the initial 
data. Training on effectively utilizing any one component of analysis takes 
dedication and a regimen of repeat usage. Preparing before deployment is 
critical to being able to make the most from these analytical tools and 
corresponding software.  
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VI. THE HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM AND CULTURAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
Many of the principal challenges we face in Operations Iraqi 
Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) stem from just 
such initial institutional disregard for the necessity to understand 
the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural 
characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight.78 
 
 Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are professional academics from various 
social science backgrounds that deploy into theaters of operation and provide 
cultural insight and subject matter expertise to commanders and staffs. The 
Human Terrain Team could play a significant role in helping plan Civil 
Reconnaissance operations, and making sense of Civil Information. The five man 
teams are lead by a military officer and have an anthropologist and subject 
matter experts of the region serving as advisors. The strength of the team lies in 
its members’ expertise. The military realizes the gap present in cultural 
knowledge as well as its effects in the counter insurgency fight. In an effort to 
shorten this gap, the military has solicited the academic community for subject 
matter experts to provide their knowledge to the war fighter in order to help make 
culturally relevant plans and avoid mistakes.  
 The Human Terrain initiative was started in 2003 with after action reviews 
coming in from conventional units detailing the lack of cultural understanding and 
how they suffered from not understanding the significance of cultural intelligence 
in getting buy in from the local community. The Pentagon initially solicited Dr 
Montgomery McFate, a Yale-educated cultural anthropologist working for the 
Navy, who advocated using social science to improve military operations and 
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strategy79. Her efforts in creating data bases and collecting open source 
information to provide to commanders were so successful and the demand from 
the field was so great the Pentagon brought on COL (R) Steve Fondacaro, a 
retired Special Operations officer to help Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) 
organize and hire the needed professionals to get academics to units as far 
forward as possible80.   
These teams have reach back capability to a network of other academics, 
researchers and social scientists throughout the US who can help support and 
analyze civil information. One of these institutions is the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California. Selected cultural expertise lies in the National 
Security Affairs Department with renowned academics such as Dr. Thomas 
Johnson81 and Dr. Vali Nasr82 . Also available to the HTT and military forces is 
the Defense Analysis Department and its Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) lab83. The lab fuses together geospatial, relational and 
temporal information in order to better understand the human terrain and gain a 
deeper understanding of the operational environment. The lab will provide 
interested students and faculty a place to collect, organize and analyze data in 
order to observe trends and ultimately anticipate actions in the field based upon a 
level of understanding of the human terrain and relevant cultural information. The  
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Defense Analysis department specializes in all the forms of Irregular Warfare and 
SOLIC related issues. With this level of expertise at the fingertips of the military 
the chances at doing things better significantly improve. 
 Human Terrain Teams were created to provide commanders with subject 
matter experts, as far forward in the battlefield as possible, in order to provide 
culturally significant information in order make better tactical and operational 
decisions. The teams presently reside at the Brigade or Regimental level. The 
home of the Human Terrain effort is located in the Foreign Military Studies Office 
(FMSO) of the Combined Arms Center located in Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. 
FMSO falls underneath the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)84. 
FMSO actively recruits from the academic community and world at large for 
persons with the proper background and credentials who are willing to go forward 
into a war zone and provide cultural insight to units and soldiers. The effort has 
received national level attention and support. In September 2006, Defense 
Secretary Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program, which will 
assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American 
combat brigades scheduled to rotate into Iraq and Afghanistan. Since early 
September, five new teams have been deployed in the Baghdad area, bringing 
the total to six85.  Presently the Department of the Secretary of Defense has 
hired a staff to help ensure the program receives the required funding.   
Conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without 
ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like building a house  
without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and 
unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for 
frustration and failure.86 
 This effort is critical to reducing the learning curve for counter insurgent 
forces and quickly makes sense out of the operational environment. Since the 
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insurgent is usually from the country or region he is operating in he possess 
cultural understanding of the people and issues that host nation civilians deem 
important. The insurgent’s strength lies in his ability to use cultural information to 
support his cause and demonize counter insurgency efforts. Many times the 
insurgents play upon the problems and injustices, whether real or perceived, of 
the local population in order to garner support and gather the people, guns and 
money necessary to fight counter insurgent forces.  
 The communist Vietnamese campaign for control of the villages in rural 
areas in the south provides an example of the very effective use of culture to 
manipulate all classes of society into supporting the insurgents. The communist 
party in its initial efforts to gain support, suppressed talk of Marxists class 
struggle and maintained a “wise and flexible attitude” with the bourgeoisie’ in 
order to attain maximum support. The communist could not afford to loose the 
support of the upper-class and thus spoke of “democratic rights” in order to gain 
their buy in.87 The plan was later revealed by Truong Chinh, in his book, Primer 
for Revolt  
First, it must be an anti imperialist revolution aimed at over throwing 
the imperialist domination, and second, it must be an agrarian 
revolution  so as to confiscate the lands of the feudal landlords 
and distribute them to the peasants. The second stage in North 
Vietnam began after the French  left and in1956 resulted in the 
virtual elimination of the bourgeoisie through a “land reform” 
program planned and executed by Truong Chinh. In what one 
western observer called an “indescribable butchery”, more than  
100,000 persons were executed or imprisoned. The Communist 
party  broke their struggle down into two parts the struggle against 
the imperialist (French, United States) and secondly against 
farmers and feudal landlords. Understanding this key piece of 
cultural information about the form of the struggle and the methods 
utilize to persuade the population to aide the Communist could 
have provided an understanding of how better to fight  the war.88  
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 For too long the insurgent have been able to utilize American cultural 
ignorance to feed their propaganda in order to strengthen their argument and 
recruit followers. Violations of cultural taboos provide the enemy with “evidence” 
of the true intentions of the US and Coalition and their desire to enslave and 
subjugate the country. When in  all reality the soldier did not know the taboo 
existed and thought he was doing a good thing by holding the elderly Afghan 
woman’s hand while she side stepped an unexploded rocket launched by the 
Taliban. Seemingly small infractions such as the handling of Afghani women by 
male US soldiers, is a cultural violation that requires an act of revenge in order to 
set the balance straight. Such acts on the part of a culturally ignorant soldier 
could have life and death consequences. Having subject matter expertise on the 
ground with the troops will help soldiers avoid making mistakes that are counter 
productive to their efforts. Ideally, the team’s presence will increase the ability of 
military planners and leaders to focus operations that are culturally appropriate in 
order to attain population support, identify insurgents, and degrade their ability to 
conduct effective operations.  The ability to conduct operations with as much 
precision as possible, will minimize collateral damage prevent the senseless 
death of innocent civilians and affect the enemy’s ability to further perpetuate 
insurgent propaganda and recruiting.  
 The Human Terrain Team could have significant impact on the ability to 
guide and plan Civil Reconnaissance operations, and help make sense of Civil 
Information. Although currently no doctrine exists to depict the relationship of the 
HTT to the military, the logical location for the HTT to insert itself is with the 
Brigade Civil Affairs Planner. If the CA planner could incorporate the HTT into a 
cell that works together, the combined knowledge and capabilities could be 
extremely powerful. Using this CA/HTT cell, information can be gathered in order 
to accurately depict the human terrain, then operations could be developed to 
target the insurgents’ efforts at controlling or influencing the population. Without 
an HTT the task of analyzing the civil terrain falls to the Civil Affairs planner who 
is more soldier than cultural anthropologist. The information a Civil Affairs soldier 
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could provide to a commander in reality will be a best guess based on what 
appears in front of him and what cultural understanding he may or may not have. 
Essentially, CA soldier can function as collectors of Civil Information but have a 
limited ability to analyze it based on their education and training; having the HTT 
present would remove that obstacle, and help commands better understand the 
information and the people. Bottom line, The HTTs could provide cultural 
expertise to a military that has very little.  
 There exists a strong opposition to the Human Terrain initiative and the 
use of anthropology to support warfare. The issue has boiled to a point now that 
concerned Anthropologist have created a pledge that is circulating to not assist in 
the HTT effort or with the military.  
The eleven originators of the Pledge are deeply concerned that the 
‘war on terror’ threatens to militarize anthropology in a way that 
undermines  the integrity of the discipline and returns anthropology 
to its sad roots as a  tool of colonial occupation, oppression, and 
violence89. 
Pledge of Non-participation in Counter-insurgency 
 We, the undersigned, believe that anthropologists should not 
engage in research and other activities that contribute to counter-
insurgency operations in Iraq or in related theaters in the “war on 
terror.” Furthermore, we believe that anthropologists should refrain 
from directly assisting the US military in combat, be it through 
torture, interrogation, or tactical advice.  
 US military and intelligence agencies and military contractors 
have identified “cultural knowledge,” “ethnographic intelligence,” 
and “human terrain mapping” as essential to US-led military 
intervention in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. 
Consequently, these agencies have mounted a drive to recruit 
professional anthropologists as employees and consultants. While 
often presented by its proponents as work that builds a more 
secure world, protects US soldiers on the battlefield, or promotes 
                                            
89 Network of Concerned Anthropologist, Frequently Asked Questions section [website] 
available from http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/faq  last accessed 2 October 
2007. 
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cross-cultural understanding, at base it contributes instead to a 
brutal war of occupation which has entailed massive casualties. 
  By so doing, such work breaches relations of openness and 
trust with the people anthropologists work with around the world 
and, directly or indirectly, enables the occupation of one country by 
another. In addition, much of this work is covert. Anthropological 
support for such an enterprise is at odds with the humane ideals of 
our discipline as well as professional standards. 
 We are not all necessarily opposed to other forms of 
anthropological consulting for the state, or for the military, 
especially when such cooperation contributes to generally accepted 
humanitarian objectives. A variety of views exist among us, and the 
ethical issues are complex. Some feel that anthropologists can 
effectively brief diplomats or work with peacekeeping forces without 
compromising professional values.  
 However, work that is covert, work that breaches relations of 
openness and trust with studied populations, and work that enables 
the occupation of one country by another violates professional 
standards. Consequently, we pledge not to undertake research or 
other activities in  support of counter-insurgency work in Iraq or in 
related theaters in the “war on terror,” and we appeal to colleagues 
everywhere to make the same commitment90. 
The chief complaint from the anthropological sciences is that 
Anthropological studies should not be used to enable the occupation of one 
country by another or breach the trust of the studied population. Favorite 
platforms for dissent stem from the use of anthropologists during previous 
conflicts that served as spies and played key roles in espionage. The favorite 
example used by the anthropologist in opposition is reference to the COORDs 
program, which they connect to the Phoenix Project and the assassination of 
identified insurgents.  
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If anthropologists on HTS teams interview Afghans or Iraqis about 
the  intimate details of their lives, what is to prevent combat 
teams from using  the same data to one day "neutralize" 
suspected insurgents? What would  impede the transfer of data 
collected by social scientists to commanders  planning offensive 
military campaigns? Where is the line that separates the 
professional anthropologist from the counter-insurgency 
technician?91 
The opposing anthropologists have no problems working for the military or 
government agencies in efforts to assist with reconstruction effort but not in 
offensive operations. While apparently altruistic the argument lacks 
understanding of insurgency warfare and demonstrates the short sidedness of 
professionals who have never lived or worked in such a conflict environment. 
Better information means less violence and death especially to civilians.  
Initial reports from the field are the Human Terrain Team are having a 
significant impact on the success of units down range. “In interviews, American 
officers lavishly praised the anthropology program, saying that the scientists’ 
advice has proved to be “brilliant,” helping them see the situation from an Afghan 
perspective and allowing them to cut back on combat operations. The aim, they 
say, is to improve the performance of local government officials, persuade 
tribesmen to join the police, ease poverty and protect villagers from the Taliban 
and criminals. Afghans and Western civilian officials, too, praised the 
anthropologists and the new American military approach…”92 While the success 
of the teams lacks theater wide metrics to determine success, the anecdotal 
examples of success coming from the locations the teams are currently in are 
extremely compelling.  
There remains lots of work to be done in making the information from the 
teams forward and the reach back cells available to others. This data and 
                                            
91 Roberto Gonzales and David Price, “Pledging to Boycott the War on Terror, When 
Anthropologist Become Counter Insurgence,” Counter Punch, 28 September 2007 [journal 
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92 David Rohde, 2. 
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analysis could be used extensively for wide spread theater and regional level 
situational awareness. Making it available to a broader audience could create the 
environment for official collaborative based research from other areas. Currently 
the Human Terrain System is in the early stages of developing software kits 
similar to the Asymmetric Software Kit in that they incorporate off the shelf 
software in various fields placed together in a suite package to interact with each 
other. The software is designed specifically for the social scientist. The HTTs will 
be outfitted with laptops complete with software to help in accumulating survey 
results, track information coming into the teams from other units using various 
software devices and versions in order to conduct some trend analysis and 
pattern social networks.  
This initiative has tremendous potential and the political emphasis to 
support the effort by getting the right people into place. Hazards exist though in 
the haste involved in creating the teams and getting them into place as fast. The 
original design of the team was never proofed as it was intended in Afghanistan 
before its implementation, so some of the bugs have not surfaced yet. 
Additionally what role or precedence will this effort take after the current threats 
in Iraq and Afghanistan subside? What will the changes in politics power mean 
for the level of support? There will remain a need to prepare and train for the next 
cultural conflict and this require sustaining the HTTs effort over the long run. 
Making the teams a part of the military package and planning is one of the long 
term challenges Steve Fondacaro and Dr. McFate face.  
Additionally there is a major overarching problem on the horizon that has 
significant impact for the HTT effort and the future of Civil Information. Currently 
the entire Human Terrain effort remains out of the intelligence community and in 
the open source run by the FMSO. If the program should become a part of the 
intelligence community the stove pipe will wrap itself around the data and seal it 
off in the regions of JWICS and classification walls that will inhibit its ability to 
move freely between units. Moreover, civilians will need higher level background 
and security checks that will inhibit the timeliness and potentially the pool of 
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candidates to draw from. One of the biggest strengths of the program is that the 
information exists in the open sources and not behind veils of secrecy. Presently 
the data and communications reside in the SIPR realm but mainly as a result of 
the fact that communications coming out of the theater are required to remain in 
those pipes, but the data itself is not classified. Other organizations stand to gain 
from the data collected and in sharing it. Other units stand to gain from accessing 
the information in order to begin to understand of the culture issues in their future 
areas of responsibility. Making cultural information a part of the intelligence 
community will further bog down a very overburdened system in intelligence and 
serve to limit the ability to gain the best academics available in the shortest 
amount of time to react to an enemy, who has no barriers or restraints and 
changes his strategy on the fly. Even in the face of some uncertainties and 
potential problems in the future the benefit the teams provide currently far 
outweigh the potential problems that might surface with the management and 
bureaucracy later. The ability to walk into a country and immediately have a 
cultural understanding from persons who are from the area or dedicated their 
lives to studying and understanding the region would drastically reduce the 
learning curve for American soldiers and allies. Getting such academics to the 
strategic level might prevent the short sightedness as demonstrated by the 
surprise of the Shia verses Sunni fight after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Cultural 
understanding is the essence of fighting counter insurgency warfare, the quicker 
American leadership understands that and continues with efforts like the Human 
Terrain Teams the sooner we can end insurgents ability to cause problems.  
 If the anthropological experts don’t contribute, the military will find other 
sources to get the information. As Anna Simons, an anthropologist who teaches 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, points out:  
If anthropologists want to put their heads in the sand and not assist, 
then who will the military, the CIA, and other agencies turn to for 
information? They'll turn to people who will give them the kind of 
information that should make anthropologists want to rip their hair 
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out because the information won't be nearly as directly connected 
to what's going on in the local landscape.93  
Without professional expertise and academics to put into context 
information found in the open source soldiers will do their own version of cultural 
analysis and develop methods of dealing with cultures they think will work. This 
trial and error approach to dealing with culture is the sort of thing that will allow 
an insurgency to point out the American’s mistakes and use the propaganda to 
further their agenda and boost recruiting efforts.  
An example of this is the Abu Ghraib scandal. Without cultural advisors 
the soldiers and leadership involved in interrogation techniques were left with 
finding out facts on their own in an effort to turn insurgents into informants. The 
interrogators used the book The Arab Mind by Raphael Patai which was a study 
of “Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, a cultural anthropologist. 
The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting sex as 
a taboo vested with shame and repression.94 “The segregation of the sexes, the 
veiling of the women . . . and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict 
contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental 
preoccupation in the Arab world,” Patai wrote. Homosexual activity, “or any 
indication of homosexual leanings, as with all other expressions of sexuality, is 
never given any publicity. These are private affairs and remain in private.”95 The 
Patai book, an academic told me, was “the bible of the neocons on Arab 
behavior.” In their discussions, he said, two themes emerged—“one, that Arabs 
only understand force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame 
and humiliation.”96 The government consultant said that there may have been a 
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serious goal, in the beginning, behind the sexual humiliation and the posed 
photographs. It was thought that some prisoners would do anything—including 
spying on their associates—to avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to 
family and friends. The government consultant said, “I was told that the purpose 
of the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could insert  
back in the population.” The idea was that they would be motivated by fear of 
exposure, and gather information about pending insurgency action, the 
consultant said. If so, it wasn’t effective; the insurgency continued to grow.97 
 These are the types of uses of the information that if not put into context 
will backfire. “Using sexual humiliation to blackmail Iraqi men into becoming 
informants could never have worked as a strategy, since it only destroys honor, 
and for Iraqis, lost honor requires its restoration through the appeasement of 
blood. This concept is well developed in Iraqi culture, and there is even a specific 
Arabic word for it: al-sharaf, upholding one's manly honor. The alleged use of 
Patai's book as the basis of the psychological torment at Abu Ghraib, devoid of 
any understanding of the broader context of Iraqi culture, demonstrates the folly 
of using decontextualized culture as the basis of policy.”98 More of this will 
happen in the course of the present insurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
unless professional step forward and help make sense out of the information that 
is out there. 
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The primary means of conducting Civil Reconnaissance is through the 
creation of operations that facilitate interaction with the local population in order 
to collect data that will provide more fidelity to the understanding of the civil 
environment, thus lessening the information gap the enemy has over counter 
insurgent forces. Some of the secondary effects of conducting these types of 
operations are that they; help defeat enemy propaganda of counter insurgent 
forces, support the counter insurgent story through action, build rapport and 
hopefully persuade non combatants with no alliance to support counter insurgent 
forces verses the insurgency.  
Although extremely important to the conduct of effective COIN, untrained 
Soldiers should avoid conducting active Civil Reconnaissance due to the 
extremely sensitive nature of cross cultural communications and the potential for 
a bad interaction with civilians. At risk is the time lost in rebuilding or 
reestablishing rapport or credibility with a local population that developed a bad 
first impression as a result of ignorance, lack of training or experience by US 
forces. Civil Affairs Soldiers are primarily trained in all aspects of CIM and 
specifically Civil Reconnaissance. The CA planners and staff should be the 
primary generators of missions and suggestions for the command in what kind of 
operations, where to conduct them and the desired end state that will ultimately 
lead to enhancing understanding of the operational environment and the human 
terrain. CA planners should be responsible for identifying the gaps in civil 
information and designing operations to close these gaps as quickly as possible.  
The primary types of information gathered while conducting Civil 
Reconnaissance center on geospatial, relational or socio-cultural, and temporal 
data. When these three aspects of civil information are combined, they provide a 
rich and detailed understanding of the human terrain and serve as guides in the 
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creation of operations that will enhance rapport and help increase the support of 
the local population. The conduct of Civil Reconnaissance does not begin once 
the Civil Affairs assets arrive at the respective area of operations but before the 
deployment begins and ends with the effective transfer of data and points of 
contact to follow on forces during relief in place operations. Over time and with 
the changes detailed in the 2006 QDR the active duty Civil Affairs will grow in 
strength and numbers facilitating the return of Soldiers to their respective areas 
of responsibility. Doing this will enable CA Soldiers to focus more directly in 
developing a deeper level of cultural understanding in order to remain ready in 
the pursuit of the radical militant Islamic insurgency as it spreads around the 
world.   
B. ISSUES THAT REMAIN  
1. Internal 
a. Development of SOP 
 (1) Collection.  The US Army active duty Civil Affairs 
community needs to quickly establish how to conduct Civil Reconnaissance and 
begin experimenting with effective SOPs in order to become proficient in 
conducting this very complex task. This is a very large undertaking in that the 
specific method of collecting civil information will vary from culture to culture and 
the best method of gaining the confidence of the population will very rarely, if 
ever be the same.  Providing broad methodologies for teams and individuals to 
adopt might be the best solution as all variations cannot possibly be captured in a 
document.  
 (2) Use of the ASK. . The method utilized to collect and 
enter the data into the ASK differs from team to team as there is no standard 
SOP as to how to execute any of the tasks related to data entry. For instance 
how are individual photographs entered into the ASK, what is required to 
accompany the photo; name, date, 10 digit grid coordinate in using the military  
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grid reference system, is it placed on the picture or somewhere else, if so 
how…etc. This is just a small example of the need to create a living SOP that will 
have to be adhered to in order to facilitate effect cataloging and  trend analysis.   
b.  Warehouse the Data 
 (1) Where to physically store the data.  Presently the 95th 
Civil Affairs Brigade, Civil Information Cell serves as the collector of the 
information that comes from the deployed Civil Affairs Teams scattered 
throughout the world. What is utilized to store the data is a Share Point server 
maintained by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). 
This server can only be accessed by DoD personnel that have access to the 
ASOC intranet with specific access to the Share Point site. Although the data is 
stored it is put on the server with no established SOP which makes retrieval 
difficult and inefficient. Once an SOP has been established a baseline can be 
created to begin cataloging the data using something along the lines of key word 
searches, RSS feeds or updates on interested subjects similar to Google 
searches.  
 (2) How to make information available to other 
organizations . With the experience of units in Iraq and Afghanistan the 
understanding of value of civil information and the need to keep it as current as 
possible is catching on. Defeating an insurgent network requires a networked 
organization. The civil information collected by CA teams forward should be 
made available if the knowledge is going to be of any significance. An 
organizations ability to access the collected data found on the USASOC Share 
Point site is restricted to; persons with access SIPR access, availability to the 
USASOC net, and then permission to access data from the site itself. Presently 
no other organization outside of USASOC has access to the data and no plans 
are currently on the table for discussion on how to reduce some of the barriers to 
this data. Ultimately, the info will have to exist in the classified and unclassified 
arena. If DoD is serious about the value of human terrain and cultural information 
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it must be made available to both military and civilian organizations in order to 
create a cinergy of effort to collect and update data as units, organizations and 
individuals pass through areas of interest.  
c.  Training  
 (1) Individuals.  No time is dedicated in the Civil Affairs 
training pipeline to educate CA Soldiers on the specifics of conducting this Civil 
Reconnaissance at the tactical, operational or strategic level.  Currently the task 
is more intuitive than institutional. Individual CA Soldiers are developing ways to 
accomplish this task depending on their environment and situation. The ASK 
software is trained during the Regional Studies course but at this point it is more 
reminiscent of learning to paint by numbers sort of education, essentially 
familiarizing CA soldiers with the capabilities of the software. The problem begins 
when the teams are given the kit with no SOP or requirements and told to 
execute essentially, move from paint by numbers to giving them a professional 
set of oil paints and a canvas and told to reproduce the frescos on the ceiling of 
the Sistine Chapel.   
 (2) Planners.  There is no organized education of CA 
planners once individuals leave a tactical team to enable them to plan, organize 
or resource tactical CA teams to conduct Civil reconnaissance. If a CA planner 
does not understand COIN in detail, or the value of Civil Reconnaissance, he or 
she will be ineffective and prevent the supported unit from understanding or 
gaining any relevant headway in defeating the enemy.   
2. External  
a. Keeping CR Out of the Intelligence Community 
Civil Reconnaissance belongs to the open source community 
specifically to Civil Affairs as it is the only force dedicated to this task specifically 
in the DoD and has the training pipeline established to support this all important 
task. If an over burdened Intelligence community should take over the function of 
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collecting, analyzing and warehousing civil information it will be instantly made 
unavailable to the civilian organizations that may serve to help keep the 
information fresh through the establishment of a reciprocal collaborative 
environment. Intelligence staff Officers should remain connected to the CA 
planner and be aware of the operations of the tactical teams in order to deconflict 
operations, use civil information to confirm or support enemy intelligence on the 
enemy and help enhance the common operating picture (COP) using civil 
information.  
b.  Evolution of Software and Technology 
As software is developed and allows soldiers to become more 
efficient at collecting and analyzing data it should be vetted and replace old 
technology quickly. One of the benefits of Civil Affairs proponentcy remaining in 
SOCOM is the environment for utilizing off the shelf technology is more 
conducive than anywhere else in the DoD. We must utilize every advantage over 
the enemy, bureaucracy and procedure hider the quick access to better tools to 
do the job. Networking civil data to make it as available as possible to counter 
insurgent forces; this is the desired end state. The individual soldier inputs data 
collected during the course of conducting a survey or after an interview with local 
national, that is instantly made available to the community at large. 
c.  Unifying the Effort  
With the other service getting more involved in Civil Affairs the need 
to quickly unify efforts in all aspects of CIM and Civil Reconnaissance is a must. 
The US Army used to hold a monopoly on this data, its collection, and analysis 
but the times is quickly coming that this will no longer be the case. If specific 
parameters are not established before other services deploy and begin 
conducting these types of operations there exists a great potential for problems, 
duplication of effort and lack of knowledge sharing.   
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d. Educating the force 
Counter insurgency warfare has been historically avoided since 
Vietnam, many of the lessons learned during that time have been lost and we are 
suffering from it now. Civil Reconnaissance and CIM are not new to the military 
but are forgotten skill. There exists a strong need to reeducate the force on the 
value of civil information and how it should be made the main effort in a COIN 
environment not a secondary aspect on the Brigade support staff. Leaders from 
the Division to the squad need an education in CIM and Civil Reconnaissance in 
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